What is this? This info-mural is one of seven Do Computers Have To 6 Be Conscious To Think? 29 David Chalmers, 1996 Can functional states generate consciousness? The fading qualia thought experiment. Imagine that your neurons are slowly replaced, 30 Anticipated by David Chalmers, 1996 People can be mistaken about their 31 David Chalmers, 1996 Rational cognitive systems have correct beliefs. Subjects who are radically mistaken 35 Selmer Bringsjord, 1992 Drugged Gigantor-building Postulates of Functionalism Is consciousness 1998 necessary for thought? 73 K. Lashley, 1956 No mental activity is conscious. None of the processing that results in conscious experience is itself No activity of mind is ever one by one, with silicon chips. experiences. People often possess Norwegians in Texas. Imagine that 1. A mental state is a functional state. conscious. When one consciously sees an image of a chair “argumentation maps” in a is misguided beliefs. For example, victims is about their experiences are not rational. Rational is and a table standing out against a background, for example, conscious. There are 3 alternatives: systems (systems whose cognitive mechanisms in the year 2020 the computational disputed of blindness denial claim they can see 2. A functional state consists of causal inputs, causal outputs, and causal relationships to one has no conscious experience of putting together the The History and Status of the Debate — Map 6 of 7 disputed disputed structure of the brain has been mapped Qualitative conscious experiences It seems impossible that one neuron will by although they are blind. So the possibility by are unimpaired) will not make enormous errors other functional states. by chairs and tables to make a scene. This happens 1 about their own conscious experiences. Even out. Four billion Norwegians have been (qualia) will disappear suddenly when make such a difference that qualia will of fading qualia (option 2) shouldn't be spread out across the state of Texas and nonconsciously. some particular neuron is replaced. suddenly (and completely) disappear. rejected, because people can form if an individual's neurons have been replaced Note: Searle views his connection principle argument by silicon chips, that person should still be are attempting to build Gigantor—an Input Output radically mistaken beliefs about their as being in part a response to this claim. See the "Does the series that explores Turing’s rational, and thereby have (at least, mostly) enormous Turing machine composed of The 1st alternative is ruled out. conscious experiences. the Norwegians, railroad cars, tracks, connection principle show that consciousness is necessary An Issue Map™ Publication 2 Qualia will gradually fade away. You will make statements about your conscious experiences that are incorrect, correct beliefs and make correct statements about his or her conscious experiences. David Chalmers blackboards, erasers, and golf carts. Furthermore, the Norwegians have been drugged, covered with electrodes hooked for thought?" arguments on this map. 74 Roland Puccetti, 1967 given the fading of qualia. For example, Thinking is associated with but does not entail question: “Can computers think to a central console, and are under the you might claim that sounds are loud even control of whatever impulses are sent to 3. A functional state is purely formal, abstract, consciousness. A machine could think without being though the sounds are actually barely them. Their actions are now under the and relational (see sidebar, "Formal Systems: conscious because thinking does not entail consciousness. audible. But given what we know about qual • i • a: The subjective feelings that dictate of natural law. Because Gigantor An Overview," on Map 7). is Thinking is merely associated with consciousness in humans, consciousness, it is not likely that such accompany perceptions, feelings, and lacked mental states before the electrode disputed but this association does not imply that machines must be misguided beliefs could occur. sensations. Examples include the smell of intervention, it seems unlikely that by conscious in order to think. and/or will they ever be able a rose, the feeling of anger, and the Gigantor will have any mental states after 4. So, functional states can be realized in multiple physical media. This is called multiple The 2nd alternative is ruled out. realizability (see the "Is the brain a computer?" arguments on Map 1). sensation of an itch. It is controversial the intervention. Hence even satisfying So it must be the case that: whether more subtle states, such as beliefs, Pollock's requirement that the information 76 Dieter Birnbacher, 1995 are always accompanied by qualia. 34 John Pollock, 1989 be guided by natural laws isn't sufficient 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953 Consciousness might still be necessary. Just because there 3 Your qualia will remain the same. Mental states only arise isn't a perfect correlation between thinking events and consciousness Start Here is supported by for the creation of mental states. BEER Statements about mentality to?” Argumentation mapping is under the constraints of is events doesn't mean that consciousness is unnecessary for thinking. Note: Compare to the "Can computers have the right causal powers?" arguments on Map 4. don't require conscious disputed natural law. To generate experiences. The truth of a Consciousness might still be necessary for thinking in general, mental states, information is by though not necessarily attached to each thinking event. That system disputed statement about some person X flow must be guided by (for example, "X thinks," or "X 33 Ned Block, 1978 isn't guided by natural laws. In the China by natural law. 5. So, we can study the mind without studying the brain. understands") does not depend Absent qualia problem. If a mental state can be example, information flow is a method that provides: on the existence of a correlated 78 William James, 1879 32 Hilary Putnam, 1967 implemented in a variety of physical media, then guided by human activities, conscious thinking event or Consciousness is counterintuitive results follow. For example, imagine that rather than by natural law. Proponents on these maps include David Chalmers, Jerry Fodor, John McCarthy, Brian Consciousness has causal powers. If McLaughlin, Zenon Pylyshyn, Hilary Putnam. conscious understanding event consciousness serves some utility (such that an 1 Alan Turing, 1950 I believe that at the end of the century ... one 28 Consciousness can be multiply realizable. A given mental state may be realized in a multiplicity is the functional organization necessary for the conscious experience involved in smelling a rose is instantiated through complex interactions among the entire population is disputed So the people of China do not give rise state, nor is to a mental should a disputed is disputed Notes: • This is a general description of functionalism. Many more specific versions have been in X. Ludwig Wittgenstein organism with consciousness is better off than an organism without it), then consciousness will Unmapped Territory Additional - a method for portraying major is supported by disputed by serve some function. Consciousness can only Yes, machines can implemented in a functional system. of mediums, because only of China. But it seems counterintuitive to conclude, as a functionalist by expect them to. by by articulated in the contexts of psychology, philosophy of mind, AI, and connectionism. 77 Shadworth Hodgson, 1870 serve a function for an organism if consciousness epi- will be able to speak of Properly organized functional states generate consciousness. Such organization the functional organization of the system counts, not functionalist must, that there would then be a rose-smelling experience brought about by complex interactions among Note: Pollock is not arguing against functionalism, but is • Arguments about functionalism pervade Maps 3 and 4 and are prominent on Map 5. Consciousness is epiphenomenal. is has effects (i.e., is capable of causing change). phenomenalism arguments machines thinking Conscious experience is a mere collateral To have effects, consciousness must have causal (or will be able to) exists in the brain but can be built into the medium in which it's the Chinese. The qualia would be absent. adding a requirement that is disputed is any functionalist theory disputed product of our nervous system, unable to exert powers. Consciousness has utility in creatures computers as well. Conscious mental instantiated. Note: Although there are different examples of the absent by without expecting to be disputed any causal influence but caused by the activities with complex nervous systems insofar as it philosophical, political, and states, like all mental states, are best Note: Also, see the "Is the qualia problem, the rose-smelling experience example is must satisfy. by by therein. "loads the dice" in favor of their survival. Hence, think. A computational contradicted. understood as states with characteristic functional roles; similarly, a mousetrap is really a mousetrap because of the function brain a computer?" arguments on Map 1, and sidebar, "Formal Systems: often referred to as the absent qualia problem. Note: Epiphenomenalism is usually traced to T. H. Huxley, but Hodgson's work is earlier. consciousness has causal powers. system can possess all it serves, not because of any particular material, shape, or parts it might have. An Overview," on Map 7. Turing Machines is pragmatic debates disputed by 37 Selmer Bringsjord, 1992 79 80 Daniel Dennett, 1988 important elements of Unmapped Territory Additional The Turing machine arose in the context of attempts by mathematicians to specify precisely what an algorithm was. Alan Turing's insight IF the AND Current IF the THEN do the AND following to the move AND THEN Cherries on the keyboard. Imagine that the console operator, while working under a cherry tree, falls asleep as a swift wind kicks up. is disputed Consciousness is irrelevant to psychology. Consciousness is irrelevant to thought, to mentality, and in general to the study of mind. Thinking and is supported by Qualia don't exist. Qualia as traditionally conceived are ineffable, intrinsic, private, and human thinking or was that any algorithm could be carried out State is ... Current symbol on the the tape change Cherries fall onto the console and hit exactly the by consciousness are independent of each other, if immediately presented to - a summary of an ongoing, functionalism by one of a class of Turing machines. Indeed, arguments Symbol tape and/or as the same keys as the operator would have typed to consciousness even exists at all. consciousness. Nothing has all he proved that an algorithmic procedure (or, instantiate the Gigantor computations. Now the these attributes; therefore, qualia reads ... halt ... follows ... Current understanding. an "effective procedure") is just a procedure that can be implemented by a device that blindly and deterministically manipulates State to ... 36 Anticipated by Selmer Bringsjord, 1992 Gigantor is still under human control. is computations are controlled only by natural laws (without human direction). Yet falling cherries should not make the difference between don't exist and should be rejected from psychology. major philosophical debate of symbols. So, Turing machines precisely define 1 0 Do nothing Right 1 Because a human runs the central console that disputed an entity having and not having mental states. Daniel Dennett the concept of an algorithm. in turn controls the Norwegians, Gigantor is by Functionalists must claim that it does make a Alan Turing 1 1 Do nothing Right 2 still under human control. So the requirement difference. Therefore, functionalism (even with A Turing machine is conceived of as an that information processing be constrained by the natural law requirement) is false. imaginary device that manipulates symbols 2 0 Erase & write 1 Right 3 natural law remains unsatisfied. on a tape. The behavior of a Turing machine 81 Kathleen Wilkes, 1988 the 20th century is supported by 38 Hilary Putnam, 1967 Machine-state functionalism. A mental state is a machine state. Any system that possesses a is determined by the state it is in and by the symbol it reads on the tape. Based on those 2 factors, the machine will do any or all of the following: enter a new state, write a symbol on the tape, move to the right or to the left, or 2 3 3 1 0 1 Do nothing Do nothing Do nothing Right Left Right 2 4 3 is supported by Consciousness is not a legitimate psychological topic. The concept of consciousness fails to denote an actual psychological structure. It is used in an assortment of circumstances but does not Get that out of my lab! - a new way of doing intellec- is mental life is simply a complex Turing machine (see sidebar, "Turing Machines," at right) instantiating a certain machine table and thereby running a halt. The table of rules (or "machine table") correlating these actions with states and symbols exhaustively specifies a given 4 4 0 1 Erase & write 0 Halt No move No move 4 4 is disputed 41 Eric Barnes, 1991 Causal interaction necessary for consciousness. Neither of the imagined machines is conscious, because neither of them can causally interact with the environment. According to the computationalists, causal interaction is a necessary is 42 Selmer Bringsjord, 1992 Adding causal input doesn't create consciousness. Imagine that the input to Maudlin's water computer machine comes occupy a place in a legitimate scientific taxonomy. "Consciousness" is unnecessary for understanding human psychology, and therefore is not a reasonable demand to place on an artificial intelligence system. tual history. program. So a computer, machine. Based on its machine table, we can component for any model of consciousness. For example, the text of a book must disputed by disputed from the external world by way of a Norwegian with a watering programmed with the correct determine exactly what a Turing machine will Current causally stimulate the reader in some way for it to be true that the reader is actually by by hose. It seems unlikely that the Norwegian's input could make the machine table, could think. do with any given tape. 1 What does it reading the book (coincidentally verbalizing the same words as those in an open book Can Note: Also, see the "Can automata Hilary Putnam State otherwise unconscious machine conscious. while dreaming with one's eyes open doesn't count as reading). is think?" arguments on Map 7. A "Universal Turing Machine" is a Turing 82 René Descartes, 1641 disputed machine that can perform all the calculations Thinking is essentially by of any other Turing machine. To emulate a conscious. It is self-evident Scanner component showing that any thought in a thinking given machine, the Universal Turing Machine Current Symbol is "programmed" with a special tape that fully Current Symbol on the tape being (or "soul") must be 43 Anticipated by Tim Maudlin, 1989 computers be 44 Tim Maudlin, 1989 conscious. Thinking can take 1 11 1 49 Bruce Mangan, 1993 describes the emulated machine's table. 0 0 0 1 The conscious computers would be so complex A block in the cog. Computationalism contradicts itself even if we imagine 2 machines of many forms, including Consciousness is an information-bearing that there would be differences between them. medium. Consciousness bears cognitive tremendous complexity running the consciousness program. Imagine that in this case that both sensory perception, Because the computers needed to instantiate a is machines allow all the proper counterfactuals. The second machine, however, has an additional is supported by imagination, understanding, information similar to the way DNA bears genetic consciousness program would in reality be so large and information. Thorough understanding of is disputed component, a block suspended mid-air in one of the (never-activated) "counterfactual gears." This desire, and doubt. disputed complex, there would have to be differences in the by block prevents counterfactual states, and so the second machine violates the nontriviality condition biological information-bearing media can only be physical activity between the 2 systems. The conscious? gained by examining both the information carried by and is therefore not conscious. So we have the same contradiction as before: only one machine is René Descartes supervenience thesis wouldn't be violated then, because contain? by any given medium (e.g., the information conscious, though by the supervenience thesis both should be. What's more, it seems odd to claim the physical activity underpinning the conscious system that suspending or not suspending a block mid-air in a never-activated part of the machine should carried by DNA), and the medium that carries the and nonconscious system would be different. information (e.g., the DNA itself). But if 39 Jerry Fodor, 1975 is make the difference between a nonconscious and a conscious machine. 84 Adhémar Gelb, 1933; consciousness is an information-bearing medium, Computationalism. A mental state is a computational state embedded disputed Kurt Goldstein, 1933, 1943 and if information-bearing media are not multiply in a complex network of inputs, outputs, and other mental states. by 72 83 Aron Gurwitsch, 1959 Categorial attitude and is supported by 3 Paul Ziff, 1959 instantiable (although the information carried is), Computationalism differs from machine state functionalism by locating Conscious experience is necessary Consciousness before concrete attitude. Evidence Computers cannot have then consciousness is not multiply instantiable. the mental in abstract computational states rather than in the various possible for thought. Consciousness and thought concepts. Thinking of an from brain-injured patients is supported by feelings. Computers are Functionalism is then false, because it claims that machine states that could implement them. A given computation (2 x 2, are necessarily linked. Without consciousness object conceptually (i.e., as suggests that we experience the 1 No machine can be conscious. 46 Tim Maudlin, 1989 Happy Sad falling under some category) 2 consciousness is multiply instantiable. for example) can be performed by many different machine table operations Computers can't be conscious. Machines can't have subjective experiences. Machines can't can't be is supported by mechanisms, not organisms. Only living organisms can be said to have feelings. Therefore, computers (1 + 1 + 1 + 1, 3 + 1, etc.). Note: Computationalism is also referred to as psychofunctionalism. 45 Anticipated by Tim Maudlin, 1989 Reject supervenience. Computationalism is only self-contradictory if all 3 of its Rejection of supervenience is unacceptable. Rejection of supervenience about election & about election a system cannot think. presupposes consciousness of that object. Consequently, world in a concrete attitude of immediate experience as well as in a categorial attitude, where consciously perceive, feel, or remember anything. (the doctrine that identical physical activity attempts by logicians to cannot have feelings. 40 Tim Maudlin, 1989 premises are accepted. The first 2 theses of is gives rise to identical conscious states) leads objects are viewed as falling into And because consciousness is necessary for thought, is account for the notion of Note: Ziff makes a similar claim Computationalism contradicts itself. Imagine 2 machines are disputed computationalism are integral to any disputed to the unacceptable consequence that a "brain-o- necessary Thinking is supported by is supported by certain categories. This is machines can't think, either. engaged in the same physical activity and are running the same computational theory of consciousness. The by conceptual thought with Note: The relation between consciousness, thinking, in the "Can computers have by scope" could reveal identical neuronal activity for propositional functions evident with victims of amnesic 2 Consciousness is necessary for thought (see Box 72). emotions?" arguments on Map 1. consciousness program. One of these machines supports counterfactual supervenience claim, however, can be rejected (down to the last atom) associated with 2 different aphasia, who continue to and mentality is itself a subject of debate, some of states, whereas the other doesn't. The computationalist must claim, to prevent the inconsistency. presuppose consciousness (and perceive in the concrete attitude which is represented on this map (around Box 72). mental states. It could even reveal that one person especially thematization or Three Premises of Computationalism based on the nontriviality condition, that the machine capable of is conscious whereas the other isn't. but can no longer perceive in the necessary for Thinking 4 Endel Tulving, 1983 Any computational theory of consciousness assumes the following 3 premises. supporting counterfactual states is conscious and the other isn't. But this contradicts the supervenience thesis: each machine exhibits the = focusing within consciousness). categorial attitude (they can't, for example, recognize a red flower Computers are not introspective. 1. Computational condition: Any physical system running an same physical activity, but according to computationalism only one and red vase as both being Unmapped Territory Thought requires the capacity for appropriately programmed machine table is sufficient for supporting is conscious. members of the category red.) Altogether the seven maps: Additional consciousness arguments 3 Therefore, machines can't think. can't be Thinking is supported by introspective episodic memories. Such memories of life episodes play a significant role in human thinking but are completely lacking in computer thinking. consciousness. 2. Nontriviality condition: It's necessary that the system support counterfactual states, that is, states the system would have gone into had input been different. 3. Supervenience thesis: Two physical systems engaged in the same Note: The machines Maudlin describes are actually complex systems of water troughs, hoses, chains, and pipes. coun •ter • fac • tu •al: Counterfactuals are conditional Tim Maudlin 47 Anticipated by Tim Maudlin, 1989 The physical activity is different in each system. The concept of physical activity is 48 Tim Maudlin, 1989 Counterfactual differences don't cause differences in activity. Counterfactual differences in 2 systems are irrelevant to differences in the physical activity of those systems. Imagine 2 pinball machines, the second of which has had exactly those pins removed that are never touched by the ball. We is supported by - summarize over 800 major (if-then) statements whose "if" clause runs counter to the facts disputed 85 Edmund Husserl, 1954 physical activity will possess identical mentality (assuming they have includes the concept of potential activity. So by now have 2 different machines but it doesn't make a difference to the paths any at all). See the definition of physicalism in the "Does physicalism of reality. For example, the statement "if pigs had wings then when you have different counterfactual Judgements are grounded in phenomenology. traced by the pinballs. The counterfactuals are different in each machine (the Predication and judgement (where objects are explicitly I doubt that these show that computers can be conscious?" arguments on this map. they would fly" is a counterfactual, because the "if" is possibilities, you actually have different physical pinballs would behave differently if the first were to hit a "counterfactual" pin), but water-filled clause—that pigs have wings—is false. disputed activity. So the physical activity in each of the perceived as having certain properties and as falling into the physical activity of the 2 systems is, as it happens, identical. certain relations with one another) characterize the activity creatures are From Maudlin (1989). by imagined machines is actually different. of the natural and human sciences. But such theoretical moves in the debates threaded conscious. thinking is grounded in more basic "lifeworld" structures of 5 Stanley Jaki, 1969 6 Roland Puccetti, 1966 bodily skill, tacit knowledge, and general understanding. For is supported by Computers can never have a conscious experience. is example, the structure of space-time described by physics is It's unlikely humans are conscious. The arguments against computer A robot can behave as if it were having a certain conscious disputed grounded in a more basic "surrounding world" of in-front-of- consciousness (based on capability and on structural comparisons between experience. But it can never actually have a conscious by me, behind-me, to-the-left-of-me, and so forth. All the special computers and humans) could be applied by computers against humans with into claims, rebuttals, and experience, because experience and behavior fall into 2 separate logical categories. equal success to show that we lack consciousness. Such arguments, therefore, are of little value. 9 Hilary Putnam, 1962 Diachronic and At Time 1, But at Time 2, Edmund Husserl sciences with their predicative judgments are grounded on phenomenology, which studies consciousness and its forms. counterrebuttals synchronic linguistics. the statement ... the statement ... "Machine" The truth value of statements excludes all (e.g., "Robots can be Does physicalism show that things that are "Machines" can 7 Jonathan Cohen, 1955 8 Keith Gunderson, 1966 mean ... conscious.") can change over Synchronic The meaning of "machine" excludes conscious. time as word use changes, even Robots can be Robots can be is supported by Claiming analytic falsity requires seeing conscious. consciousness. The word "machine" though the meaning of such conscious. - 97-130 arguments and rebuttals into the future. Claiming that the statement The meaning excludes not only all things that can live or "machines can be conscious" is analytically false statements remains constant. die but specifically all things capable of is is supported by Statements that are now false stays the same (i.e., that it's false given the meanings of the being conscious or unconscious, because disputed under synchronic linguistics computers can be conscious? words) requires that one foretell every possible that is part of the meaning of "machine." by change of use of the words that comprise the (the study of language at a Any attempt to cross-pollinate the given time) may become false, Diachronic may be may become statement—an impossibility. Therefore, one per map categories of "conscious things" and "machines" violates their inherent meanings. dictionary shouldn't say that such statements are analytically false. as revealed by diachronic linguistics (the study of language through time). But the truth value changes FALSE TRUE - 70 issue areas in the 7 maps 51 Building a conscious machine. Physicalism lays 52 Dwight Van De Vate Jr., 1971 the foundation for a conscious computer, but other is supported by An artificial person is a Does the connection is supported by important conditions must be also be satisfied before the Person requirement for artificial project of building a conscious computer will have consciousness. To create Is the any chance of success. - 32 sidebars history and further artificial consciousness one must first create an artificial person. Being a person is fundamental Conscious ness to acquiring the properties only principle show that 55 Gottfried Leibniz, 1714 persons have, such as A conscious machine consciousness. sol • ip • sism: background consciousness 13 John Stuart Mill, 1878 could not be explained Argument from analogy. I can assume that others have feelings like I do by Note: Also, see the "Can There are several varieties of by its physical workings. computers be persons?" solipsism. Metaphysical solipsism extending a generalization I know to be true of myself. My body is often affected If we were to walk into an by stimuli, which generate feelings, which in turn generate outward behavior. We is arguments on Map 1. is the thesis that nothing exists enlarged machine that could Corbis-Bettman 11 Alan Turing, 1950 disputed consciousness is outside of one's own mind. Strong can observe the first and last parts (stimuli effects and behavior) in others and can "think, feel, and have Be a solipsist or be pragmatic. It seems reasonable to generalize that the middle link exists as well. by think of consciousness as a necessary requirement for thought epistemological solipsism perception," nothing requirement until you ask: "How do you know if someone else really has maintains that nothing can be witnessed could explain its conscious experiences?" Realizing that one really can't be sure known to exist outside one's mind. conscious qualities. of the existence of other minds might incline one toward Weak epistemological solipsism is the view that one can never know Gottfried Leibniz solipsism (the view that the only mind that definitely exists is is supported by necessary for thought? whether other people possess Ouch! The argumentation maps: one's own). But pragmatically, we often decide that others have 53 Keith Gunderson, 1985 Amazing. I am conscious minds on the basis of behavior alone, just as we should do with minds. (From A. R. Lacey's 56 Keith Gunderson, 1985 The perplexity condition. yet I am physical. How solipsistic? computers. Dictionary of Philosophy, 1976.) The relationship between physicalism If a machine is to be could that happen? Note: This argument is one of Turing's motivations for PAIN 14 Sydney Hook, 1960 and machine intelligence cannot be a pri • o • ri: Literally, "prior to" experience. A is supported by considered conscious, it must proposing the Turing test. See Map 2. The argument from analogy settled a priori. We should not assume that priori knowledge (in the form of concepts, be perplexed by its own You see him is false. The argument from physicalism applies categorically to propositions, or judgements) is knowledge gained 2 is consciousness. It must be able - arrange debate so that the cur- is supported by 12 Knowledge of other minds is based on external behavior. Because we have no direct access to the internal lives of other entities, we judge is supported by 1 You see a yell "Ouch!" 3 You infer that there was an experience is disputed analogy requires the ability to make comparisons between ourselves and others. But as children, long before we are capable of making such sophisticated comparisons we are disputed by everything in the universe. Physicalism may be true for machines or for humans, or for both, but there is no intrinsic a priori way to settle the matter. or applied without recourse to experience of the world. Proposed examples of a priori knowledge include that 2 + 2 = 4, that all material bodies exist in space and time, and that God exists. to wonder, "How is it that am I am conscious?" 86 John Searle, 1990a rent stopping point of each No mechanisms could feel (and not whether or not they have mental lives based on their man touch by already convinced that some people The connection principle. There merely artificially signal, an easy is fire. of pain between the have conscious lives because they is a necessary connection between 87 John Searle, 1990a external behavior. 2 other events. contrivance) pleasure at its successes, disputed Supported by act in the way we understand 57 Dieter Birnbacher, 1995 consciousness and mentality. All Mental states have aspectual shape. A thought grief when its valves fuse, be made 10 Geoffrey Jefferson, 1949 by "The Turing Test Is an Adequate Test of Thinking," Map 2, Box 2. conscious creatures should act. We What about God? Belief thinking (as a form of mentality) is at about water differs in aspectual shape from a thought miserable by its mistakes, be charmed Mechanisms can't possess then make a comparison between in a Christian god is least in principle accessible to about H2O, even though the 2 thoughts are about the You infer that she them and others (not between is is supported by 54 J. R. Lucas, 1994 same thing. Similarly, a belief about the morning H2O 1 You see the woman consciousness. Even unconscious debate thread is easily seen by sex, be angry or depressed when it human consciousness. No 2 incompatible with the claim is supported by cannot get what it wants. (p. 1010) mechanism could consciously feel 15 Bertrand Russell, 1948 drinking. must have been ourselves and others). disputed that consciousness requires Consciousness requires a point of view. A conscious machine could be built, but not thoughts involve consciousness, in star differs from a belief about the evening star, even Similar behavior has similar thirsty. by I am not unless it was built with a point of view. The following would be evidence that a machine that they can potentially become though the 2 beliefs refer to Venus. Many cognitive pleasure, success, grief, flattery, or any a physical basis. God can physical, but I possessed a point of view: Physicalism scientists make the mistake of characterizing aspectual causes. Other people have conscious. My belief that California • displaying homeostatic (goal-directed) behavior, of the range of emotions and thoughts presumably think, yet is not conscious inner lives similar to our can think! is on the west coast, for example, may shape in terms of brain properties, behavioral • displaying holistic assessment of its context and context-dependent responses, is supported by that humans experience due to their physical or biological. Jaegwon Kim (1996) takes 3 principles as defining own. We believe this because our be unconscious when I sleep, but it is properties, or some other third-person properties. • ascribing consciousness to it provided offered some explanatory power. complex neurophysiology. No - identify original arguments by is supported by behavior is often caused by minimal physicalism. But aspectual shape is a property of subjective mental mechanism, then, can possess truly at least potentially conscious in that John Searle human consciousness. conscious mental states, and it's Thirst 1. Mind–body supervenience: Physical it can be brought to consciousness if states—there is nothing like it in the brain. The most as • pec • tu • al shape: An essential Note: A similar argument from reasonable to suppose that other is I am asked for directions to California. we can say is that brain states have the causal capacity property of intentional states (beliefs, people's similar behavior has indiscernability entails psychological to produce aspectually shaped experiences. Jefferson is included in the "Can disputed desires, perceptions, etc.) that stipulates that similar causes. indiscernability. computers have emotions?" arguments by 50 58 Frank Jackson, 1986 2. Anti-Cartesian principle: There are no purely they be directed at things from a specific over 380 protagonists world- on Map 1. Because consciousness is physical What Mary doesn't know. Imagine a future time when the physical sciences mental things. perspective, "under some aspects and not Geoffrey Jefferson it can be implemented in a computer (including neurophysiology) are complete. A scientist named Mary learns every 3. Mind–body dependence: what mental others" (Searle, 1990a, p. 587). or robot. Physicalism is the doctrine that physical fact there is to know, but without ever in her life having left her properties a thing has depends on its physical But, not everything is physical. If everything is is black-and-white room. One day she finally leaves and sees a red tomato. At that consciously. properties. physical then consciousness is physical as disputed point she learns something new despite the fact that she already knew every Supervenience wide over 40 years well. So a conscious computer or robot by neurophysiological fact about color experiences. This shows that complete I want 89 John Searle, 1990a could be built out of physical parts. knowledge of the physical universe still leaves out facts of subjective experience. IF The water thought must be accessible to water. Ah, now we So physicalism (which implies that complete knowledge of the physical universe won't leave anything out) must be false. = see what the "I want water" brain stuff is. consciousness. Even the purported counterexample to the connection principle requires the connection principle. The water-seeker thought - make the current frontier of experiment only makes sense given its unstated THEN is premise that the "I want water" thought is actually is 60 Owen Flanagan, 1992 disputed accessible to consciousness. Without this premise, disputed by 59 Thomas Nagel, 1974 Consciousness cannot be reduced to physical processes. is The phenomenal component is only part of the real nature of consciousness. The full reality of consciousness requires understanding = by 88 Anticipated by John Searle, 1990a The water seeker thought experiment. is disputed by there would have been no way for the scientists to make a correlation between the "I want water" An essential feature of physicalism is that it explains appearances disputed both its experiential component and its physical underpinnings. So looking Imagine a complete science of neurophysiology that could neurophysiology and the "I want water" conscious debate easily identifiable Note: Other philosophers would describe physicalism in terms of their underlying physical reality. For example, the by for third-person, physical explanations contributes to our understanding of differently. determine the existence of a thought simply by applying a experience. For the thought experiment to make sense, appearance of lightning can be reduced to the reality of electrical consciousness (as long as we don't then throw out the experiential component). "brain-o-scope." And imagine some individual who possesses the we must assume that at some point someone - provide summaries of eleven Other consciousness Can higher-order representations discharge. But it doesn't make sense to ask what conscious experience reduces to, because the distinction between appearance and reality does not apply to consciousness. Within consciousness the appearance is the reality. So consciousness cannot be reduced in the normal scientific manner as "nothing but" some other physical process. is disputed 61 John Searle, 1992 Causal reductionism. It is possible to understand how mental states could at the same time be physical states. Physical brain states cause on • to • log • i • cal re • duc • tion: The most important type of reduction, in which an object is shown to consist "I want water" thought neurophysiology but for some reason can't become conscious of his thought about water. The connection principle is then disproved by example. consciously experienced the "I want water" thought while being monitored by a brain-o-scope. Note: For a description of the brain-o-scope, see "Rejection of Supervenience Is Unacceptable," Box 46. arguments by They are a produce consciousness? mental states in the same way that a lattice structure of molecules causes solely of another type of object. For example, a gene logical liquidity. Mental states are causally (but not ontologically) reducible to consists solely of DNA molecules. possibility, and major philosophical camps of physical states. 90 Ned Block, 1990, Searle can't 91 John Searle, 1990a as articulated by John Searle, 1990a account for An unconscious intentional The connection principle doesn't allow for them. zombie is impossible. The mental caus • al re • duc • tion: A form of reduction in unconscious intentional zombies. Unconscious Impossible! states of an unconscious zombie can 16 Hilary Putnam, 1975a which the causal powers of some object are shown to be intentional zombies (zombies that have thoughts about is never become conscious, and thoughts Let's just say robots are conscious. We must simply make a decision one way or the other about robot is supported by 62 John Searle, 1992 entirely the result of the causal powers of another type is that can never become conscious can't the protagonists (or schools of Normal ontological reductionism doesn't work for consciousness. In explanations of the world) should remain at least a logical possibility in disputed is consciousness, because there is no correct answer to the question, "Is that (psychologically isomorphic and of object. For example, the causal powers of a solid disputed any theory of consciousness. But they are ruled out by by have a perspective (an aspectual shape). disputed behaviorally similar) robot conscious?" consciousness, the subjective, first-person component cannot be reduced away as "nothing but" object (i.e., to remain impenetrable) are explainable in by And where there is no aspectual shape, the connection principle, which demands that all by • We can't say that it is conscious. 20 John Locke, 1690 physiological activity because then the essential feature of consciousness would be left out. This is terms of the causal powers of molecules in its lattice intentionality and thinking be accessible to there's no intentionality. So, there • We can't say that it is not conscious. "Consciousness is the unlike many other scientific explanations, in which the subjective component can be (ontologically) structures. consciousness. Therefore, Searle's connection principle cannot be a totally unconscious zombie • We can't say that we don't know if it is conscious or unconscious, even though it must be one or the other. is reduced away as unimportant. For example, in physical explanations of the nature of color, the color disputed perception of what must be false. that's also capable of having a thought thought). All 3 claims presuppose that a claim about robot consciousness has a truth value, but it doesn't. passes in a man's own experience is ignored in favor of a claim about photon emission of certain wavelengths. But in consciousness about something (an intentional state). by the appearance is the reality. How do I get a mind." Consciousness is a Corbis-Bettman form of perception directed Mind-Body Problem: Historical Background 17 Dennis Thompson, 1965 inward toward the activities 63 Thomas Nagel, 1974 Rejection of conscious machines has undesirable consequences. Rejection of the idea that of one's mind. What is it like to be a bat? Imagine what it would be like to be a bat, Hmm ... Green Bay machines can be conscious leads us more closely to: is supported by The mind-body problem is the problem of understanding how the 93 John Searle, 1994 Packers' backup is supported by perceiving your environment through echolocating sonar, eating insects, is • solipsism—because if we deny consciousness to a robot that can do everything we can do, we have less and flying through the night. It seems impossible that a person could ever mind (and its conscious mental states) relate to the body (and its The Green Bay Packers' backup quarterback ... it's just disputed reason for claiming that other people (with equivalent behavior) are conscious as well; John Locke physical states). Some consider mind and body to be part of one 92 Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore, 1994 quarterback. Two beliefs—one unconscious, on the tip of my experience what a bat experiences. At best, one can guess what it would by • epiphenomenalism—because if we deny consciousness to a robot that can do everything we can do, we deny one conscious—are identical if: • they possess the same mode and content, be like to use echolocation, but one can never really know what it's like to substrate (a belief known as monism, held, for example, by The connection principle assumes that unconscious tongue! • they are based on the same causal mechanisms. that a mind causes such behaviors, and then we must admit that human behavior might not have mental be a bat. Physicalism, because it claims that everything in the universe is physicalists), whereas others think that mind and body are separate mental states are identical to their conscious causes as well. 21 Philip Johnson-Laird, 1988a is counterparts. Searle presupposes that any given unconscious state is 19 Computational structure is necessary for consciousness. To be conscious a robot must physical, should be able to explain subjective experiences. But it seems substances or aspects of one kind of substance (dualism). disputed is identical to its conscious form. But this is nonsensical, because disputed For example, imagine that you are having Consciousness arises from be built with: impossible that anything we might learn about bat neurophysiology could by difficulty trying to remember the name of a past by • low-level parallel processors operating on distributed symbols; higher-order representational shed light on the bat's actual subjective experiences. identity is partly determined by causal powers. But the causal is supported by Unmapped Territory Green Bay Packers' backup quarterback. Then it • a hierarchy of processors that plan and set goals and monitor the lower-level processors; He's following structures. Consciousness is a powers of an unconscious state are different from the causal powers printed copy? 18 Keith Gunderson, 1968 finally comes to you! Just prior to that, your belief • higher -level processors, with a serial structure, that monitor the lower levels. rules but still multilevel hierarchical structure of 65 Dieter Birnbacher, 1995 of a conscious state. Hence, the 2 states cannot be identical. That computers follow rules is no reason to Additional was unconscious. But it was the same belief—it conscious. representations that allows higher- The highest-level processor generates consciousness in the robot. A representation of the processor's Artificial consciousness must be nonorganic. For was about the same person, and it was based on the deny them consciousness. Merely showing that level representations to monitor mind-body a machine was programmed to exhibit certain behavior own operations (used as a guide for behavior) generates self-reflection. consciousness to be truly artificial it must arise from nonbiological same underlying neurobiology. So, the 2 beliefs is lower-level representations. matter; it can't just be artificially made. One could, for example, arguments disputed and follow certain rules is no reason to conclude that 64 Colin McGinn, 1991 are identical. the machine lacks consciousness. After all, thorough 22 Daniel Dennett, 1976 is supported by artificially build a human brain, neuron by neuron, but the resulting by A conscious robot is in principle possible. If a is consciousness would still be natural—that is, instantiated in the descriptions of consciously initiated human behavior Consciousness is a higher-order system. Consciousness is 23 Georges Rey, 1980 robot is built with a brain physically identical to a disputed is Higher-order representations are material it naturally arises in. Artificial consciousness must arise reveals plans, and plans are a form of rule following, a higher-order representational structure within a rational system that disputed human's brain, and we know that the human is by 94 Ned Block, Either Or is supported by insufficient. Multiple self-referential levels from material unlike that of the brain. 1990 and humans are conscious. we can take an intentional stance towards. To take an intentional by conscious, then the robot will be conscious too. This stance towards a system is to assume for the sake of convenient of representations are not sufficient for self- follows from the supervenience thesis, which requires is The consciousness. This can be seen by reflecting 67 Hilary Putnam, 1960 connection The connection principle is a claim about access The connection principle is a claim about interaction with the system that it has intentional states (beliefs, desires, that physically identical systems will have identical The various issues and puzzles that disputed consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, etc.). on how easy it is to build a self-referential mentality. The fact that the robot and the human came The mind-body problem isn't a real world make up the traditional mind-body by principle system that is obviously not self-conscious. into existence via different means is irrelevant. problem. A conscious machine does not constitute a problem are wholly linguistic and dilemma. Building a truly self-conscious machine in which case in which case Legend is supported by 24 David Rosenthal, 1986 A conscious state is a higher-order thought. A conscious state occurs when a thought would be much harder. solution to the mind-body problem, because the mind- body problem isn't a real world problem at all. It is a purely logical and conceptual problem (i.e., a verbal, logical in character: whatever few empirical "facts" there may be in this The connection principle leads to a dilemma. any mental state, to be a mental state, must be any mental state must in principle have an is directed at a lower-level mental state. Self-consciousness occurs when a third-level thought area support one view as much as capable of being reported and reasoned about. associated feeling. But whether or not is directed at the second level thought. For example, a state of happiness is a first-level mental is word-use problem). As such, it sheds no light on the another. (p. 148) Focus Box: The lowest-numbered box in each issue area is an introductory focus box. disputed world, nor is it illuminated by the construction of a In this case, the connection principle is obviously every human thought has an accompanying The arguments on these maps are organized by links that carry a range of meanings: state, the thought "I am happy" is a second-level conscious mental state, and the thought "I am Putnam false, because one might have a conscious state feeling is an unsettled empirical issue for The focus box introduces and summarizes the core dispute of each issue area, sometimes thinking about being happy" is a third-level self-conscious state. by special kind of machine. but not be able to report it (e.g., because one's which philosophical reflection is unhelpful. as an assumption and sometimes as a general claim with no particular author. mouth is taped shut). Arguments that uphold or defend another claim. Examples include: 26 John Pollock, 1989 68 Colin McGinn, 1991 ac • cess con • scious • ness: Mental states is supported by supporting evidence, further argumentation, thought experiments, Arguments with No Authors: Arguments that are not attributable to a particular source 25 John Pollock, 1989 A self-scanning robot would be a conscious robot. Blindsight can be explained by faulty scanners. Humans cannot solve the mind-body ? In Either Case that are available for reporting and reasoning. extensions or qualifications, and implemented models. (e.g., general philosophical positions, broad concepts, common tests in artificial intelligence) are listed with no accompanying author. is supported by Building a conscious robot is simply a matter of building a machine that monitors its own internal activities (this is supported by The internal-scanning model is supported by evidence from blindsight victims. Blindsighters receive perceptual input (level 1 activity) but are not conscious of that internal 66 A conscious robot would be a ? problem. It is in principle impossible for us to solve the mind-body problem, because a The connection principle should be rejected. You can order artist/researcher solution the mind–body is solution to it lies outside our conceptual generates a conscious feeling) and that scans the results of those monitorings (this generates awareness of the feeling). activity due to a failure of their higher-order scanners (a problem. If a conscious robot disputed powers. Our predicament is similar to that of phe • nom • e • nal con • scious • ness: A mental failure of level 2 and 3 activities). were built, the mind–body problem by an ant grappling with relativity theory. Just as state that has a certain feeling associated with it. A charge made against another claim. Examples include: Citations: Complete bibliographic citations can be found in the booklet that accompanies There are then 3 levels: the internal activity, the first-level an ant will never understand the principle of You can't just point is scanning, and the second-level scanning. Both would be solved. This could disputed logical negations, counterexamples, attacks on an argument's this map. consciousness and the ability to learn are made possible blind • sight: People with blindsight claim to be happen in 1 of 2 ways. relativity, humans will never understand the anywhere in here and say signed copies of all seven maps emphasis, potential dangers an argument might raise, thought is mind-body problem. "that's mental." by by the two scanning levels. disputed blind in some part of their visual field yet are able, 1. The mind–body problem is is 95 Noam Chomsky, 1990 experiments, and implemented models. Methodology: A further discussion of argumentation analysis methodology can be found by under forced-choice circumstances, to guess solved first, and the solution disputed Connection principle is 3. Second-level scanning correctly about objects in that portion of their is used to build a conscious by merely definitional. in the booklet that accompanies this map. visual field. robot. Arbitrarily defining 70 Keith Gunderson, 1985 from www.macrovu.com for is supported by 2. The robot is built accidentally, "mental" as something 97 John Searle, Either Or is interpreted as and then scientists analyze it Any conscious machine must satisfy the inextricably bound to Anticipated by Where this phrase appears in a box, it identifies a potential transparency condition. A conscious machine 1994 A distinctive reconfiguration of an earlier claim. attack on a previous argument that is raised by the author to figure out the solution to would not face the same mind-body problem that we consciousness, as in the Consciousness The consciousness pill would make It would only make unconscious 2. First-level scanning 27 Leopold Stubenberg, 1992 the mind–body problem. connection principle, is bad do, because anyone who could build a conscious pill unhelpful. all the activities of the brain processes conscious, so that it can be disputed. Blindsight actually refutes the scanning theory of consciousness. The fact science. dictionary A consciousness $500.00 plus shipping and han- that blindsighters can learn refutes the scanning theory of consciousness. If blindsight is machine must have understood the workings of the conscious, human mind well enough to have solved the mind- pill would do 1 in which case As articulated by Where this phrase appears in a box, it identifies a reform- is to be explained as a failure of higher-level scanners and if those scanners also make disputed of 2 things. learning possible, then blindsighters shouldn't be capable of learning, that is, of improving by body problem. Building a conscious machine implies in which case Unmapped Territory This icon indicates areas of argument that lie on or near the ulation of another author's argument. The reformulation 1. Internal activity that the human mind has become transparent in its 96 Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore, 1994 the thought experiment is still at tasks involving their blind fields. But evidence shows they can learn. Therefore, the The consciousness-pill thought boundaries of the central issue areas mapped on these maps. is different enough from the original author's wording to scanning theory is false. is supported by inner workings. it wouldn't help differentiate the unhelpful, because no basis is given dling. Additional experiment. The connection principle is nonconscious from the for describing how the pill warrant the use of the tag. This phrase is also used when Keith Gunderson is arguments It marks regions of potential interest for future mapmakers supposed to be controversial. But even if we disputed unconscious. differentiates nonmental and explorers. the original argument is impossible to locate other than in is imagine an extreme form of the connection neurophysiological processes from 71 Keith Gunderson, 1966 disputed principle it's not controversial. Imagine that a by its articulation by a later author (e.g., word of mouth), or mental processes. We can't know whether future machines will shed light on mentality. Knowing by consciousness pill were invented that made to denote a general philosophical position that is given a whether future machines will illuminate human mentality requires: normally unconscious processes (e.g., special articulation by a particular author. • knowing the specific ways in which language changes when terms normally applied to humans principles of language use) conscious. This pill In Either Case 69 Dennis Thompson, 1965 begin to be used for machines; would in essence be an extreme version of the One of 7 in this Issue Mapping™ series—Get the rest! A conscious machine wouldn't shed light on human is • knowing whether we will understand the machines we build (it's not obvious we will understand connection principle. But such a pill would not The consciousness pill does not act as a means of differentiating the mentality. Conscious machines, if they existed, would disputed The Issue Mapping™ series is published by MacroVU Press, a division of MacroVU, Inc. them); refute cognitive linguistics or cognitive science mental from the nonmental. Because the essential benefit of the © 1998 R. E. Horn. All rights reserved. The remaining 6 maps in this Issue Mapping™ series can be ordered with MasterCard, VISA, check, face the same mind–body problem that humans do, so by • knowing whether the relevant features of the machines we build also occur in humans. in general. It's just an interesting possibility. connection principle is that it provides a criterion for distinguishing the MacroVU is a registered trademark of MacroVU, Inc. Issue Map and Issue Mapping are trademarks building a conscious machine wouldn't shed light on the Because we have no way of predicting these issues, we have no way of knowing how, or if, future Version 1.0 of Robert E. Horn. or money order. Order from MacroVU, Inc. by phone (206–780–9612), by fax (206–842–0296), Because this possibility isn't controversial, mental from the nonmental, the pill differs from an extreme version of workings of human mentality. machines will shed light on human mentality. there is something wrong with Searle's account. or through the mail (Box 366, 321 High School Rd. NE, Bainbridge Island, WA 98110). the connection principle and is, as a thought experiment, unhelpful.