What is this? 4 Can Chinese Rooms Think? 1998 Can computers have the right causal powers? 65 Philip Cam, 1990 64 John Searle, 1980a, 1980b, 1990b Sufficient causal powers don't imply necessary and sufficient 66 Karl Pfeifer, 1992 is supported by Understanding arises from the causal powers. Searle initially claims that the causal powers of the is Cam misunderstands the sense of "right causal powers." Searle is "right causal powers." Any system brain are sufficient for intentionality. From that initial sufficiency claim, disputed doesn't claim that anything that produces intentionality must be equivalent disputed capable of semantic understanding and Searle wrongly concludes that anything with intentionality must have by to a brain. He just claims that there is some set of causal powers (brain-based by The History and Status of the Debate — Map 4 of 7 intentionality must have (at least) the causal powers equivalent to those of the brain. But we can imagine many or otherwise) that is necessary for understanding, and that formal computer same causal powers as a brain has. systems that are sufficient to produce intentionality but that aren't programs lack that set of causal powers. Can an internalized We know that brains are able to equivalent to brains. produce understanding. It is an open 69 Steven Savitt, 1982 empirical question whether other The series of Chinese simulators. We can imagine a series of thought experiments materials, like silicon, can have ranging from a case in which a demon replaces one of the speaker's neurons to a case sufficient causal powers to produce 67 John Haugeland, 1980 That person's brain in which the demon replaces all of the speaker's neurons. Clearly, when one neuron An Issue Map™ Publication understanding. A Chinese Room–style argument shows that That demon still has the right causal powers; it is has been replaced the speaker will still understand Chinese; such a simulation would Chinese Room think? has the right be very low-level. As more neurons are replaced, then the degree of simulation This info-mural is one of seven causal powers are just needed some 68 John Searle, 1980a, 1980b, 1990b disputed causal Causal powers are maintained if the simulation increases. At what point does the person cease to understand Chinese? No clear line insufficient for powers, but it help from the demon. by can be drawn here, so Searle's claim about low-level simulations won't help him. understanding. Searle's is low-level enough. The person whose doesn't neurotransmitters have been replaced still understands claim that the right causal understand is I have the right is disputed Chinese because she still has the right causal powers; she causal powers. powers are sufficient for Chinese. disputed just needs some help from the demon. The demon Necessary and Sufficient Conditions “argumentation maps” in a understanding can be refuted by ! by by his own Chinese Room simulation is low-level enough that the relevant causal !! , ! ! logic. We can replace a effects—the physical stimulation of neurons—are still Necessary and sufficient conditions are different kinds of conditions on an event Conditioned Event ! [Of course I understand Chinese, you idiot!] initiated, and so intentionality is maintained. Start Here 36 John Searle, 1980a, 1980b, 1990b relevant causal power in a Chinese speaker's brain (for (called the conditioned event) that takes place. In the Chinese Room argument, the Can the Chinese example, neurotransmitters) series that explores Turing’s The internalization reply. Suppose the 37 Robert Wilensky, 1980 conditioned event in question is intentionality man in the Chinese Room memorizes the The subsystem understands. The with a demon that simulates that causal power's function (or understanding, or semantics, or meaning), rule book and all the symbols and does the man who has internalized the room may and the question is whether various other matching in his head rather than on scratch not understand Chinese, but he contains an without understanding Chinese. This shows that events (brain processes, computer program, paper. He now incorporates the entire information-processing subsystem that 71 Dale Jacquette, 1989 etc.) are necessary or sufficient conditions or Chinese Room system, but he still does is does understand Chinese. having the "right causal question: “Can computers think Carleton misreads Searle. Carleton misreads Searle as saying that brain processes or something as both for intentionality. In this example, the Room, considered as not understand Chinese. So, the whole disputed Note: Similar arguments are played out in powers" is not sufficient for powerful as them, must produce intentionality. But all Searle is saying is that if something is intentional, conditioned event is a window breaking. 1 Alan Turing, 1950 I believe that at the end of the century ... one system doesn't understand Chinese. by the "Can translations occur between the internalized Chinese Room and the internalizing English speaker?" arguments understanding. then it must have been produced by a brain or by something as powerful as a brain. Note: Jacquette also thinks that Searle's right causal powers argument is faulty (see "The Brain's Causal ? ? Ispeak don't Powers Can Be Reproduced by a Computational System," Box 73), but he doesn't think that Carleton makes Yes, machines can will be able to speak of on this map. a ?? 70 Lawrence Carleton, 1984 is a good case against Searle. Sufficient Conditions and/or will they ever be able word of ? disputed Sufficient Condition ? ? Chinese? Searle commits the fallacy of denying the antecedent. a total system, think? by A condition whose presence ensures the machines thinking Searle makes an invalid argument by drawing a bad conclusion (or will be able to) without expecting to be 38 Daniel Dennett, 1987 is disputed by from 2 premises. Premise:If certain brain-process equivalents are present, then they produce intentionality. Denying the Antecedent occurrence of the event. A thrown rock or a gun blast are each sufficient to break the window. There are many possible sufficient ... or ... ... or ... think. A computational contradicted. conditions for the occurrence of the event to?” Argumentation mapping is Understanding is a result Premise:Formal computer programs do not have these equivalents. The fallacy of denying the antecedent is a bad inference of this form: (1) if x, then y. (2) Not x. Therefore, (3) not y. (dropping the window, punching it, blasting of speed and complexity. But the premises do not imply the conclusion. it with a laser beam, etc.). No human being can Conclusion: Formal computer programs do not have intentionality. system can possess all 18 Anticipated by John Searle, 1980a, 1980b, 1990b The systems reply. We can consider the person in the room is disputed is disputed by manipulate symbols fast enough or accurately enough That is, Searle commits the fallacy of denying the antecedent. Example Explanation Necessary Conditions a method that provides: to come close to simulating 1A If a rock is thrown at a window, the 1B The antecedent is the first part important elements of as part of a total system that includes the rule book, scratch paper, and data banks of Chinese symbols. The whole system, not only the person, should be regarded as understanding Chinese. by Chinese translation in real time. No human being can memorize the Chinese symbols, as window will break. If of the if-then statement (x), in this case that a rock is Necessary Condition A condition that must be present for the event to occur. For instance, the window The window was impacted The window thrown at a window. was thin human thinking or is disputed 19 Richard Sharvy, 1983 The systems reply misses the point of the Chinese Room thought suggested by the internalization reply. It is the very speed and 72 Richard Double, 1983 will only be broken by events that have enough force in relation to the thickness with enough force. ... and ... enough. ... and ... - a method for portraying major by experiment. All the Chinese Room argument is intended to show is that Programming may be necessary for understanding. Even if (strength) of the window. All necessary That whole complexity of computer Then understanding. system understands Chinese. is disputed by instantiation of a program that understands Chinese is not sufficient to prove understanding. For this, all Searle needs to show is that something instantiates such a program but does not understand Chinese. So, the fact that the room as a Daniel Dennett software that permits humanlike thinking to occur. is disputed by Searle is right that programs by themselves are not sufficient to produce intentionality, they still might contribute to the causal powers that underlie intentionality. Imagine a case in which 2 brains have evolved, conditions are required in order for the window to be broken. Note: The example of the breaking window is of an empirical nature, so the conditions discussed do not hold with absolute logical force. Such conditions are sometimes intended to have stronger force, for example, in logic or math. We use the window whole may understand is irrelevant, because the man (who instantiates the program) 1 to speak Chinese and 1 to speak English. Scientists would explain 2A Itthat is not the case a rock was 2B The denial of the antecedent is the denial of x, in this case, example because it is illustrative. philosophical, political, and doesn't understand Chinese. He is enough of a counterexample by himself. their linguistic differences in terms of underlying neurological differences. Alan Turing 39 John Fisher, 1988 Either Or But this probably wouldn't be the whole story; we would expect some of thrown. It is just the denial that a rock was The levels of the linguistic differences to result from programming as well. sitting there. thrown at a window. is conscious The man unconsciously follows the The man consciously follows the 3 disputed involvement rules in the rule book, rules in the rule book, 2A Therefore, window was the 3B The conclusion that the window 2 dilemma. Once the was not broken contains the pragmatic debates by not broken. 1 man internalizes the in which case in which case fallacy. It does not follow from system, the Chinese the combination of statements 1A and 2A Room argument fails strong AI would not expect the man as far as we know the man may that the window was not broken, because Can learning computers regardless of what to understand Chinese any more than understand Chinese after all. 73 Dale Jacquette, 1989 the window may have been broken by level of involvement it would expect any other element of The brain's causal something other than a rock, for example - a summary of an ongoing, we imagine the man to the Chinese-speaking system to powers can be by a gun blast, a punch, and so forth. have with it. understand Chinese. reproduced by a is 20 David Cole, 1984 fal • la • cy of com • po • si • tion: disputed computational system. is supported by The Chinese Room I'm not wet. In Either Case A computational system cross the syntax– The parts of a system need not have the by argument commits the properties of the whole. For example, H H that could duplicate the major philosophical debate of 2 Allan Newell and Herbert Simon, 1976 fallacy of composition. Just individual water molecules aren't wet, O The predictions of strong AI are not refuted. microlevel functional 74 John Searle, 1989 Physical symbol systems can think. "A physical because one part of the Chinese but it doesn't follow that water itself is structure of the brain No level of formal program can produce semantics. Jacquette thinks I symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for Room (the man shuffling is argue that no program could ever be a mind. But I never make that claim. A not wet. duplicates the brain's causal disputed general intelligent action. By 'necessary' we mean that any symbols) doesn't understand That's so complex that I powers. If, as Searle says, it program could be a mind, if it were implemented in a medium with the right causal system that exhibits general intelligence will prove upon Chinese, it doesn't logically 40 John Fisher, 1988 have no idea whether or by powers. What I argue is that no program, no matter how low-level it is, could ever is these causal powers that semantics barrier? analysis to be a physical symbol system. By 'sufficient' we follow that the Chinese Room We lack adequate intuitions about the not he understands give rise to intentionality, then produce semantics solely by virtue of syntactic symbol manipulations. So Jacquette's the 20th century mean that any physical symbol system of sufficient size can be organized further to exhibit general intelligence" (p. 116). Note: The Chinese Room debate mapped here is only one of many debates related to the question of whether physical symbol systems can think. Other sets of arguments are as a whole doesn't understand Chinese. 21 Richard Double, 1983 David Cole is disputed by man who internalizes the Chinese Room. In the original Chinese Room argument we have clear intuitions about what's going on inside the man's head––we know he understands English but not Chinese. such a system would possess intentionality. appeal to microlevel isomorphism won't help. Supported by "The Chinese Water-Pipe Brain Simulator," Box 5. - a new way of doing intellec- mapped on Map 3. is supported by 22 C. A. Fields, 1984 Chinese. However, once he internalizes 76 John Searle, 1989 Allen Newell Herbert Simon The man in the room is not in a position to is supported by Locus of control is not 88 Paul Thagard, 1986 In Double's account, brains lack the room we no longer have such clear judge for the rest of system. Whether the is understanding. Double thinks that a part of a intuitions. We don't know what's going on in assumed by the Chinese Room Semantics can emerge from programs that learn. A system with sufficiently room as a whole understands Chinese has nothing disputed system, such as a homunculus in a Japanese his head anymore because of the complexity argument. The assumption of a complex learning mechanisms can possess semantics. Such a system must meet a is to do with the opinion of a homunculus within it. by Room, cannot understand in the way that a of the process of internalizing the room. We central locus of control is not an is supported by principle of inductive adequacy, which states that the system should possess inductive disputed The man's perspective provides no evidence about assumption of the Chinese Room mechanisms that are capable of producing all the knowledge constructs that the system tual history. system as a whole can. Based on that account, a lack adequate intuitions to determine whether 77 Dale Jacquette, 1990 by the system as a whole, and hence is irrelevant for brain in a person cannot understand in the way or not he understands Chinese. Searle's arguments argument. I give several examples uses in its behavior. A rule-based system must be able to generate new rules, a frame- Locus of control is never What does it determining whether the system has mentality. that a person as a whole can. presuppose a locus of programs (beer-can systems, water based system must be able to generate new frames, and so forth. 75 Dale Jacquette, 1989 pipes, etc.) that don't need a central abandoned by Searle. Searle of control, like that never gives an example of a Searle assumes a central locus of locus of control. My only ho • mun • cu • lus: Literally, "little man." We don't need control. Searle presupposes that any simulation guy. assumptions are that "programs are system without some locus of is supported by 23 Richard Double, 1984 phenomenology control. In the Chinese water- In philosophy, a homunculus generally refers to is 41 John Fisher, 1988 for a general of a native Chinese speaker will involve some syntactical, syntax is not sufficient 89 William Rapaport, 1988 a fictional person, agent, or being used to make Fields mistakes an Phenomenology is not required of a is for semantics, and minds have is pipe example there is a man Internal semantics is realized 90 Neil Jahren, 1990 disputed epistemological cognitive theory. central locus of control that manipulates symbols disputed Human understanding is not reducible to some philosophical point. by general cognitive theory of understanding. without understanding Chinese. But consider semantics." disputed controlling the faucets. In the in syntactic networks that argument for a Even if we think we have intuitions about what by Note: For more on these assumptions, by internalization reply there is a learn. A network of appropriately is internal semantics. No program, even if it can metaphysical one. is a model of a Chinese speaker that lacks any learn, can possibly have understanding in the human 3 John Searle, 1980a, 1980b, 1990b goes on in the mind of the man who internalizes the such locus of control (for example, a version of see the "Syntax–Semantics Barrier" man who remembers the books, connected syntactical symbols, disputed The Japanese Room disputed room, such intuitions are not relevant to a cognitive arguments on this map. For baskets, and so forth, and who which can learn by deriving by sense. Primitive categories are necessary for The Chinese Room argument. Imagine that by a computational system that models the brain's understanding, and a program cannot generate these a man who does not speak Chinese sits in a room thought experiment was theory of understanding. A general cognitive theory Jacquette's response to these manipulates the symbols in his consequences from inputs, only supposed to make microlevel functional structure). Searle has not is supported by categories by itself. and is passed Chinese symbols through a slot in of understanding is only responsible for explaining shown that such a model would not understand assumptions, see "The Chinese Room head. possesses internal semantics. 24 Richard Double, 1983 the epistemological point Dale Jaquette the door. To him, the symbols are just so many competence (having all the right rules) and Chinese. Argument is Circular," Box 58. Such a system can be said to The Japanese Room thought experiment. Suppose we have a computer that a man in a room can't understand because human performance (applying the rules in context), but is contain? squiggles and squoggles. But he reads an English- system that behaves as if it understands Japanese. Now imagine that the system is language rule book that tells him how to manipulate tell us whether the room not responsible for explaining the phenomenology of understanding seems to result large enough that we can put a man inside of it and ask him to run some part of the as a whole is thinking. It from the same kind of internal the symbols and which ones to send back out. To I'm just manipulating squiggles and system. We would not expect this man in the Japanese Room to be aware of the understanding. is supported by the Chinese speakers outside, whoever (or was not supposed to semantics. William Rapaport squoggles to produce Chinese language mental states of the system because he doesn't have access to the activities of the make a metaphysical whatever) is in the room is carrying on an intelligent behavior. But I don't understand room as a whole. The man's observations thus say nothing about the intentionality conversation. But the man in the Chinese Room point about what can or Chinese. This rule book is in English. of the Japanese Room as a whole. can't have intentionality. does not understand Chinese; he is merely Is biological naturalism valid? Either Or is supported by manipulating symbols according to a rule book. [Whoever or whatever is in that room He is instantiating a formal program, which passes 42 Philip Cam, 1990 is an intelligent Chinese speaker!] A dilemma about the Turing test for intelligence, but nevertheless he does not understand Chinese. This shows that cognition and 91 Neil Jahren, 1990 The man engages in cognitive activity The man engages in cognitive activity with Is strong AI a instantiation of a formal program is not enough intentionality. The The Chinese record-book thought experiment. Imagine that internalization reply without Chinese-speaking Chinese-speaking intentionality (e.g., he may to produce semantic understanding or 27 John Searle, 1982 intentionality. When he operates the Either.... know that "squiggle-squiggle" is generally the man in the room is given record books in which he can write intentionality. Just read what they've written. There are relies on the notion 80 Klaus Obermeier, 1983 down his own Chinese symbols, and that his manual has been revised that cognition and internalized Chinese Room, he actively followed by "squoggle-squoggle"), 79 Klaus Obermeier, 1983 Note: For more on Turing tests, see Map 2. For lots of cognitive scientists who are adherents of Understanding feelings 92 William Rapaport, 1988 as follows. • He can record specific symbols he gets from outside. intentionality are thinks, even though he doesn't Understanding is They display linguistic more on formal programs and instantiation, see strong AI—just read what people have written. doesn't require having The Korean Room thought experiment. Suppose there is a Korean professor • He can modify or delete an entry in his record book on the basis is necessarily connected. understand what the squiggles and in which case is supported by essentially linguistic. competence, therefore the "Is the brain a computer?" arguments on Map is They have identified themselves in their disputed squoggles mean, is feelings. If a computer can who is widely recognized as an expert on Shakespeare, even though he reads and they understand. valid category? 1, the "Can functional states generate published commentaries on the Chinese Room But this leads to a Understanding involves no is supported by of symbols he gets from outside. disputed disputed French properly apply words Of course I writes only in Korean. He reads Shakespeare in translation, and the papers he writes • He can syntactically correlate symbols with one another and with by dilemma. that intentionality may carry over to the assumption about biological or consciousness?" arguments on Map 6, and sidebar, by argument. in which case internalized Chinese Room as well. by denoting emotions to others, understand are translated into English. Even though he does not understand English he does "Formal Systems: An Overview," on Map 7. internal processes, but is inferred then it can understand those love. Those understand Shakespeare. In the same way, even though the man in the Chinese symbols passed to him from outside. 1 from behavioral performance. words. We aren't required people are in • He can formulate strings based on this correlation of symbols. we can't justifiably deny the presence Room does not understand the squiggles and squoggles, he may understand Chinese. gle 2 Handling linguistic information to justify our first-person love ... The man in this modified Chinese Room can accumulate more and Altogether the seven maps: ea quig of some kind of cognition in the by relying on context and Tak iggle-s basket t 3 26 Yorick Wilks, 1982 internalized Chinese Room. Swahili emotional reports, so why more symbols and can, in that sense, "learn," but he still doesn't squ from and pu Searle attacks a straw man. acting in accordance with rules should a computer be understand Chinese. To the man in the room, the symbols are just sign ber 1 le By attributing strong AI to straw man: A reinterpretation of an is sufficient for understanding. required to? 87 J. Christopher Maloney, 1987 so many more squiggles and squoggles. num xt to a squogg 25 John Searle, 1980a, 1980b, 1990b cognitive scientists without opponent's view that makes it easier to 78 John Searle, 1980a, Learning programs don't help. ti ne oggle- asket The Chinese Room argument refutes quoting them, Searle attacks a attack. In Either Case 1980b, 1990b The syntax–semantics barrier is not squ from b - summarize over 800 major strong AI but not weak AI. The Chinese is overcome by complex learning straw man. No one in AI thinks Biological naturalism. sign ber 2. is supported by disputed 82 John Searle, 1989 Room argument refutes strong AI by showing procedures. A liver is complex but that successfully functioning Consciousness and num that running a computer program is not enough by programs must explain human The internalization reply doesn't conclusively refute the idea that machines can think. intentionality are caused 81 Dale Jacquette, 1989 Intentionality is both abstract and biological. it doesn't understand anything. Syntax and Semantics to generate any real understanding or intentionality. Intentionality is irreducibly abstract. Jacquette claims that I misunderstand the abstract Making a program complex won't understanding. Researchers by and realized in the brain. Intentionality is irreducible to biological is nature of intentionality and places too much emphasis on However, it does not refute weak AI, which simply is give it understanding either. generally offer their computer The brain has the right phenomena, just as space-time is irreducible disputed biology. But Jacquette fails to recognize that intentionality Syntax and semantics are widespread notions in linguistics, philosophy, uses computers as tools to study the mind. Weak disputed is moves in the debates threaded John Searle in •ten •tion •al •it •y: The property (in reference to a mental state) of being directed at a state of affairs in the world. For example, the belief that Sally is in front of me is directed at a person, Sally, in the world. AI is an appropriate research program; strong AI is not. weak AI: The position that computers are a simulations as models of what human thinking might be like. is disputed by 43 Jack Copeland, 1993 The "part-of" principle is fallacious. The internalization reply rests on a fallacious "part-of" principle, whereby if you can't do X, no part of you can do X. causal powers to produce intentionality. by to physical phenomena. Intentionality, like space-time, is primitive and fundamentally abstract. by can be both biological and abstract. Jacquette's position is the result of a lingering dualism that disembodies the abstract features of intentionality. disputed by That liver is complicated, but it doesn't understand anything. and cognitive science. Traditionally, syntax and semantics are branches of linguistics, syntax being the study of how words are arranged into sentences, semantics being the study of meaning in language. In philosophy, semantics generally involves questions of reference (how terms or names correspond to objects in the world) and truth (whether into claims, rebuttals, and Intentionality is sometimes taken to be synonymous with representation, useful tool in psychology. They help Just because the man who has internalized combinations of terms, as in statements or sentences, correspond to facts researchers test and evaluate theories about strong AI: The position that an appropriately 83 David Cole, 1984 understanding, consciousness, meaning, and semantics. Although there programmed computer really is a mind. the Chinese Room can't speak Chinese, 84 David Cole, 1984 in the world). Syntax generally concerns the abstract structure of formal how the mind works. it does not follow that no part of him can Searle's materialism is problematic. are important and subtle distinctions in the definitions of "intentionality," Computers can possess mental states just by Though he denies it, Searle's biological naturalism The superneuron thought experiment. Suppose a conscious neuron internalizes a map of its whole systems (e.g., rules regarding the ordering and manipulation of terms in "understanding," "semantics," and "meaning," in this debate they are speak Chinese. is surrounding neural system along with transfer functions for each other neuron. Its nucleus swells with predicate logic). virtue of formal symbol manipulations. disputed and right causal powers claims commit him to sometimes used synonymously. Note: For a similar argument, see "The is supported by information, and it becomes a superneuron. It gradually replaces all the other central nervous system Chinese Room Argument Commits the by a form of materialism. This materialism is Liver neurons, which shrivel from disuse. The man whose skull it inhabits notices no change in his Chinese counterrebuttals problematic because we can imagine cases in In Searle's Chinese Room argument, syntax is used to refer to formal Fallacy of Composition," Box 20. Jack Copeland fluency. His superneuron has the right biological causal powers (because the man still speaks Chinese), structure or "shape"—the abstract ordering of the squiggles and squoggles which the brain has the biological causal powers but the superneuron doesn't understand Chinese like the man does because it is only aware of the formal to understand Chinese, but fails to do so. and the relations the rule book sets up between them. Semantics is used manipulations it undertakes. to refer to an actual understanding of what the squiggles and squoggles mean in Chinese. This is not, however, to say that everyone who 86 addresses Searle understands these terms in the same way. - 97-130 arguments and rebuttals The syntax–semantics barrier can be overcome by programs that learn. If a computer is given the ability It may be helpful to note that in the context of the Chinese Room debate, Can brain simulators think? is to learn it can generate semantics from low-level syntax. syntax is often taken to be synonymous with such phrases as "formal disputed Note: Also, see the "Can physical symbol systems learn as structure" and "computational form," and semantics is often taken to be by humans do?" arguments on Map 3. synonymous with such terms as "understanding," "meaning," per map "intentionality," and "phenomenology." 4 Anticipated by John Searle, 1980a, 1980b, 1990b 5 John Searle, 1980a, 1980b, 1990b Can translations occur I'm telling you, I don't understand Chinese! 47 David Cole, 1991 48 Selmer Bringsjord, 1992 - 70 issue areas in the 7 maps The brain simulator reply. A computational system that simulated the The Chinese water-pipe brain simulator. Cole confuses persons with is complete brain (i.e., the pattern of neuronal firings) of a Chinese speaker The man doesn't Imagine that the man in the Chinese Room is given a new rule book that tells him how 45 J. Christopher Maloney, 1987 personalities. Multiple virtual between the internalized disputed would be able to understand Chinese. is understand Chinese but a is to operate a huge system of water pipes. The water pipes simulate the pattern of neurons We should listen to the man. The man's personalities may exist in one brain, by Supported by disputed virtual person may. disputed own claim that he doesn't understand Chinese Can computers cross the in the brain of a Chinese speaker. When the man receives Chinese input, he looks up in but multiple persons may not. "The Chinese Gym Argument," Map 5, Box 5. by the English rule book which valves to turn on and off, then he lets the brain simulator do is overrides his behavior (which indicates that he Maloney is right that the man by disputed who internalizes the room A psychiatric patient with multiple does speak Chinese). He has the last word on - 32 sidebars history and further its work, and the faucets squirt out a Chinese response. Even though the water pipes personality disorder is not Note: This has also been called the connectionist reply, which claims that simulate the formal properties of the Chinese speaker's brain, the man controlling them by what his mental states are. doesn't understand Chinese. However, there might be a virtual possessed by a variety of virtual connectionist neural networks are not affected by the Chinese Room has no understanding of Chinese. persons, but rather by a psyche Chinese Room and the argument. person in his brain who does understand Chinese. There could fractured into a variety of syntax–semantics barrier? even be 2 separate virtual people personalities. background 46 J. Christopher Maloney, 1987 in the same brain, each of whom Failure to translate proves failure to understands a different language. understand. Learning to translate is a necessary The fact that none of the 3 people internalizing English is is consequence of learning a second language. If you is (the 2 virtual people and the man disputed disputed can't translate from a second language, then you disputed who internalized them) can vir • tu • al per • son: A formal implementation of the by by don't understand that language. Because the man by translate their own language into structure of human understanding. A virtual person is like a 94 John Searle, 1990b the others' languages says nothing 93 Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland, 1990 who internalizes the room can't translate from The third axiom is a logical, as opposed to an Can robots think? virtual machine, which is a machine that emulates another Searle's third axiom cannot be decided in advance Chinese to English, he doesn't understand Chinese. about their individual abilities to machine by instantiating its formal structure. For example, an empirical, truth. That syntax is not sufficient for semantics speak and understand their own of scientific research. Searle's third axiom assumes 8 Jerry Fodor, 1980 old Atari video game console can be run as a virtual machine that syntax cannot produce semantics. But the question is a logical truth, not an empirical question. To see this, notice speaker? languages. 85 John Searle, 1990b Causal connection with the on a brand new Pentium computer. The syntax–semantics barrier. You can't get of whether syntactic machines can be used to produce that its converse raises inconsistencies. Imagine that syntax world is essential to meaning. there from is sufficient for semantics, and that there is some Chinese The argumentation maps: semantic understanding is exactly what is at issue in Mental states become meaningful 50 David Cole, 1984 here. classical AI. It is an empirical question that cannot be thinking going on in the Chinese Room as the man shuffles (i.e., intentional or semantic) by The brain-programming thought experiment. Scientists decided in advance of scientific research. Searle's third the symbols. What makes the syntactical manipulations give 7 John Searle, 1980a, 1980b, Searle uses the being causally connected to the program an isolated and unused part of Searle's brain to is supported by Axiom 1: Computer programs off a specifically Chinese semantics? Different people could are formal (syntactic). axiom (which is nearly identical to his first conclusion) 1990b wrong causal external world through the senses 44 David Cole, 1984 understand Chinese. After the operation, Searle is told that he thus begs the question of whether machines can think. interpret the symbols so that they would give off other 6 Anticipated by connection can speak Chinese. Searle laughs and says, "Don't be silly." But Axiom 2: Human minds have The Chinese Room can and through the ability to act on The man understands Chinese, but he can't translate it into English. Once the man is is semantics. The man shuffling the symbols could view them - arrange debate so that the cur- John Searle, 1980a, with the world. the scientist's explanation was in Chinese! So, Searle understands mental contents (semantics). be placed inside the the external world. Searle's has internalized the system, he then speaks and understands Chinese. But his English- and Chinese- is supported by disputed disputed as a chess game, a second person looking through a window 1980b, 1990b Chinese but doesn’t know it. Axiom 3: Syntax by itself is robot. Merely putting a response to the robot reply shows speaking subsystems can't communicate. He understands both English and Chinese but cannot by by could see them as stock market predictions, and so on. is The robot reply. neither constitutive of nor computer program in a robot us that a little man mediating translate between them. disputed Suppose that a computer is is inadequate because we is symbols is the wrong kind of causal is supported by sufficient for semantics. Syntax by system were put inside a 1 Conclusion 1: Programs are I can interpret robot that had been disputed can put the Chinese Room disputed connection, but Searle's response 49 David Cole, 1991 that any way I neither constitutive of nor rent stopping point of each by inside a robot and apply the by does not demonstrate that no causal I speak perfect [I speak perfect 51 David Cole, 1984 The Kornese Room thought experiment. Imagine that the man in the room constructed with a English. The brain-transplant thought experiment. Part of a Chinese sufficient for minds (p. 27). want. television camera for same thought experiment as connection could ever produce Chinese.] internalizes 2 rule books. One gives answers like those of a young Korean man, and Semantics before. Send Chinese symbols meaning at all. speaker's brain is transplanted into Searle's skull. Searle finds himself the other like those of an old Chinese woman. Hence it is a Korean/Chinese or sight, mechanical arms for making odd sounds in response to questions in Chinese. In English, doing things, and legs from a television camera to the 1 "Kornese" Room that is internalized. Neither of the 2 virtual people that result man in the room and transform 2 3 Searle insists he speaks no Chinese. However, monolingual Chinese understands the other's language, and the man who internalizes the room only for movement. Such a is supported by speakers report that, not only does Searle speak Chinese fluently, but debate thread is easily seen system, equipped like the symbols he sends out into is understands English. The fact that the man can't translate from Korean or Chinese arm and leg movements. The that he is insisting, in Chinese, that he speaks no English! is irrelevant to whether the virtual people understand their respective languages. Paul and Patricia Churchland a human to interact disputed with the world, would man is still just manipulating by 3 have genuine formal symbols without 2 intentionality. knowing what they mean. 1 - identify original arguments by 11 Natika Newton, 1988 9 John Searle, 1980a, 1980b, 1990b Symbols and causal connections cannot by themselves produce meaning. Symbols and causal 95 Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland, 1990 The luminous room argument. Searle's Chinese Room argument attempts to answer a scientific question by appealing Either Or over 380 protagonists world- A goal-directed robot. Imagine a robot that connections are not sufficient to produce meaning (or, 96 John Searle, to our naive intuitions about the mind. Imagine a similar thought experiment (supporting a similar set of axioms and 1990b Syntax is understood as a Syntax is understood in terms of performs at least 2 kinds of tasks. intentionality). If there is any meaning in a system, it can only conclusions) directed against James Maxwell's 1864 hypothesis that light and electromagnetism are identical. In this luminous is supported by 10 Natika Newton, 1988 • It is able to move around its environment to find be because there is something more to the system than just the The luminous purely formal property, the physics of its implementing Other Chinese Room arguments room argument we are asked to imagine a man waving a magnet in a dark room. Could waving the magnet around produce Do Chinese Rooms electrical sockets that recharge it. If a socket fact of a symbol and the fact of a causal connection. room is not the medium (e.g., the computer on Repeatable goal- light? Our naive intuitions seem to say that it wouldn't, but scientific research has confirmed Maxwell's hypothesis. Both in which case which the program is run), directed actions can recharges it, the robot marks "yes" in its memory same as the is the luminous room and the Chinese Room attempt to settle empirical questions by appealing to naive intuitions. Chinese Room. wide over 40 years ground intentionality. for that socket. If the socket drains the robot's Symbols and causal is battery, it marks that socket "no." connections are not enough disputed disputed The luminous the analogy fails because in which case A robotic device can be • It is able to answer questions about stories in its electromagnetism has causal is supported by by is room argument imagined that has intrinsic to get intentionality. by memory, responding accurately to queries with disputed exploits a properties and formal syntax the analogy holds but is irrelevant intentionality. The robot Axiom 1: Electricity and magnetism are forces. instantiate programs? "yes" or "no" answers. by problematic does not. to AI, because AI researchers are has intentionality by virtue is 58 Dale Jacquette, 1990 Axiom 2: The essential property of light is luminance. interested in the formal properties of the fact that it makes Such a robot has intentionality if it can demonstrate analogy between - make the current frontier of disputed The Chinese Room argument is circular. The Chinese Room argument is supposed to show Axiom 3: Forces by themselves are neither constitutive of programs rather than in the connections between the meaning of its "yes" and "no" answers in terms by of nor sufficient for luminance. syntax and of the actions its uses when seeking to recharge its that syntactic symbol manipulations can never yield semantic meanings. But to show that syntax electromagnetism. causal properties of silicon symbols and its past and doesn't yield semantics, Searle assumes that the man in the room performing syntactic operations Conclusion 1: Electricity and magnetism are neither circuits. present goal-directed batteries. Intentionality just amounts to this kind constitutive of nor sufficient for light (p. 33). of connection between an entity's symbols and its understands no Chinese. But to do this Searle must again assume that syntax can't yield semantics. actions. 52 Joseph Rychlak, 1991 In Either Case goal-directed actions. The Chinese Room cannot process symbols predicationally debate easily identifiable 28 or oppositionally. The Chinese Room lacks understanding because Start Here The man in the Chinese Room doesn't instantiate a program. A human being (or a is supported by The analogy lacks force against the Chinese Room argument. it cannot operate on the meanings of symbols. In particular, it cannot To prove that homunculus) shuffling symbols in a room is not a proper instantiation of a computer program, and narrow down the meaning of an already meaningful symbol (predication), so the Chinese Room argument does not refute AI. nor can it "reason from what is the case to what is not the case" Note: For more multiple realizability arguments, see the "Is the brain a computer?" arguments on Map (opposition). All the Chinese Room can do is shuffle symbols around which assumes that 98 James Moor, 1988 1, the "Can functional states generate consciousness?" arguments on Map 6, and sidebar, "Formal 97 Georges Rey, 1986 The empiricist reply. There is empirical - provide summaries of eleven (mediation). Systems: An Overview," on Map 7. Note: For elaboration on these concepts, see the "Dialectical" arguments Syntax can generate natural meanings. Reliable causal connections between evidence that suggests that semantics can on Map 3. doing syntactic manipulations a syntactic system and the world are sufficient to generate natural meanings. emerge from low-level syntax. A bar code syntax does not reader, for example, is purely syntactic at Can a combination 29 R. J. Nelson, 1989 imply semantics does not give the man in the The proper algorithm is constitutive of thought. room an understanding of Chinese For example, Similarly, if an AI system is a low level, but at a higher level it represents information about how bar codes relate to Legend major philosophical camps of There is no homunculus involved in human thought, so 54 John Searle, 1980a, 1980b, 1990b because a 160 reliably causally connected sales, inventory, and so forth. Similarly, is supported by Searle's Chinese Room does not implement a program in The many mansions reply is 140 to the world, its (syntactic) Egg foo 53 Anticipated by you assume that thermometer is young is in high-level semantics may emerge from a trivializes strong AI. By expanding 120 & the same way that real AI seeks to. In real AI the disputed reliably causally belief that egg foo young is robot with a self-organizing network that The arguments on these maps are organized by links that carry a range of meanings: ! algorithms constitute the thought of the agent; they are not John Searle, 1980a, 1980b, 1990b the project of AI to include any device 100 front of me! by connected to the in front of it will mean makes reasonable inferences from implicit robot/brain simulator think? algorithms run by an agent that already has its own is The many mansions reply. The that can artificially produce 80 world, when it (semantically) that egg foo information. thoughts. disputed problems raised by the Chinese Room is intentionality, the many mansions reply 59 James Moor, 1988 60 the protagonists (or schools of The empirical content of a theory reads 60 degrees young is in front of it. Arguments that uphold or defend another claim. Examples include: by argument only exist because of the present disputed trivializes the project of strong AI. It The pseudorealization fallacy. Fantastic realizations 40 limits the kinds of realizations which it means that the Note: For a similar state of technology. Someday we will be by is entirely possible that someday some is of the computational theory of mind, such as Searle's man are possible (p. 49). temperature is 20 argument, see "Causal Inventory is supported by supporting evidence, further argumentation, thought experiments, 3 able to build devices that reproduce the device will possess intentionality, but in a Chinese Room, are irrelevant to empirical psychology. extensions or qualifications, and implemented models. disputed 60 degrees. Connection with the World 2 causal processes that are involved in that is irrelevant because the Chinese Relevant realizations are subject to empirical constraints; ! 1 is supported by 30 Jerry Fodor, 1991 intentionality. At that time, artificial Room argument is meant to refute the by they can't be arbitrary pseudorealizations. For instance, Is Essential to Meaning," Proper instantiations Box 8. thought). require the right causal intelligence will be able to explain more specific thesis that formal although by some stretch of the imagination a stomach can 12 Anticipated by John Searle, 1980a, 1980b, 1990b connections. The Chinese computational processes can produce be thought of as an information processor, such a realization Sales A charge made against another claim. Examples include: intentionality. is likely to be ad hoc. The stomach must consistently exhibit is Room argument exploits a vague logical negations, counterexamples, attacks on an argument's How do I get a The combination reply. Taken For next step in the disputed is separately, the systems reply (Box 18), 13 John Searle, 1980a, 1980b, 1990b definition of instantiation that the kind of processing specified by information-processing is disputed If we knew how the robot worked. If the robot looked and behaved suitably like a human, allows any series of events to be algorithm, check psychology. One can't just pick out a new section of the by emphasis, potential dangers an argument might raise, thought the robot reply (Box 6) and the brain is Alpha Centauri in disputed by simulator reply (Box 4) each fails to disputed it would be rational to explain its actions in terms of intentionality. However, if further information considered instantiations if only Where should I stomach each time a new computational state is required. by experiments, and implemented models. they are related to each other in 1,000 years. Note: For more multiple realizability arguments, see the "Is prove that computers can think. Taken by gave us another way to explain its behavior without appeal to intentionality (e.g., if we found 55 Lawrence Carleton, 1984 put the wood? in combination, however, they show that out that it acted on the basis of formal symbol manipulations), then we would no longer appeal 32 Aaron Sloman, 1986 the proper sequence. However, The Chinese Room is more than a simulation. In a the brain a computer?" arguments on Map 1, the "Can a syntactic system can think. That is, a to intentionality in to explain its behavior. Implementations of computer programs must perform this concept allows for some very is mere simulation, the inputs and outputs are not of the same functional states generate consciousness?" arguments on reliably. The man in the Chinese Room can't reliably implement a Map 6, and sidebar, "Formal Systems: An Overview," on 99 Richard Double, 1983 is interpreted as total Chinese-speaking system that strange instantiations. For disputed type as the phenomenon being simulated. For example, a fire The syntax–semantics barrier is as included a robotic body, transducers, and program because he is a human and humans are unreliable. The man example, according to that by simulator doesn't take wood as input or generate heat as Map 7. 81262 52698 A distinctive reconfiguration of an earlier claim. might get tired, bored, or distracted, and thereby not follow the rule James Moor much a problem for Searle's theory as a brain simulator, would be able to think. definition, a sequence of program output, so a fire simulator is a mere simulation. But in the it is for AI. Intentional systems are made up book correctly. A good implementation must exhibit "a strong causal steps may be spread out over Chinese Room the inputs and outputs (symbol strings) are the connection between physical representations of programs and the of parts that lack intentionality. For example, thousands of years and vast same as those used by a real Chinese speaker. Therefore, the is supported by many biological systems are composed of behavior they produce." Because the Chinese Room fails in this is 101 Richard Sharvy, 1983 is supported by distances in space and still be an Chinese Room is more than a mere simulation of Chinese speaking. printed copy? respect, it is not a proper implementation of a computer program. disputed neurons that lack intentionality. These neurons Color spectrum–inverting instantiation. But such sequences Note: Also, see the "If a simulated intelligence passes, is it aren't what we intend by by work on a purely syntactic level, just as lenses. People who learn language Focus Box: The lowest-numbered box in each issue area is an introductory focus box. intelligent?" arguments on Map 2. computational elements do in a computer. So zzzzzzz ... computational instantiations. A it seems that the syntax–semantics barrier is while wearing color spectrum– The focus box introduces and summarizes the core dispute of each issue area, sometimes better notion of instantiation inverting glasses use color words as an assumption and sometimes as a general claim with no particular author. as much of a problem for brains as it is for is supported by Do humans, unlike computers, would also require that a state be appropriately even though they lack machines. Because Searle insists that the usual semantic hookup to the related to other states around it in 56 Patricia Hanna, 1985 intentionality is caused by and realized in a nonarbitrary causal way. Because Searle is trapped in a dilemma. The Chinese Room can't be as Searle 60 James Moor, 1988 world. Whatever colors mean to these Arguments With No Authors: Arguments that are not attributable to a particular The man in the Chinese Room is an alien. The Chinese Room argument relies brains (see "Biological Naturalism," Box 78), people is irrelevant to their linguistic this kind of nonarbitrariness is describes it because it either has semantics after all or else it can't speak Chinese. the syntax–semantics barrier is also a problem competence because they use the source (e.g., general philosophical positions, broad concepts, common tests in artificial not exhibited in the Chinese on the assumption that the man in the room carries out millions of operations per Room, the Chinese Room is not second with perfect accuracy. But no human being, even in principle, could do this. for his theory. terms correctly. intelligence) are listed with no accompanying author. have intrinsic intentionality? an instantiation of a program. Either Or Real humans get lazy, bored, distracted, and so forth. Therefore, the man in the Either Chinese Room must actually be a kind of alien possessing a "mix of superhuman 102 Richard Sharvy, 1983 Citations: Complete bibliographic citations can be found in the booklet that accompanies capacities and subhuman ... needs and desires" (p. 40). 100 Richard Sharvy, 1983 The sky The Chinese Room uses an The room works purely on syntactic Some people who are blind from is blue. this map. The notion of semantic hookup is 33 Richard Sharvy, 1983 integrated syntactic–semantic rules, is birth use color terms competently. is problematic. Searle thinks that semantics Computers and humans run programs differently. A man is component to produce fluent disputed People who are blind from birth but use is supported by disputed is 61 R. J. Nelson, 1989 only arises when symbols are given meaning Methodology: A further discussion of argumentation analysis methodology can be instantiating a chess program without knowing what he is doing is not disputed Chinese-speaking behavior, in which case by color terms correctly lack the usual by disputed Chinese-speaking behavior is too limited to serve as a counterexample to strong AI. by being hooked up to the world in an playing chess. However, a computer doing the same thing is playing chess. by semantic hookup but still display linguistic found in the booklet that accompanies this map. That machine by Searle's Chinese Room only displays a small subset of intentional human behaviors, namely, Chinese appropriate way. But this notion of semantic is supported by 15 Daniel Dennett, 1987 Nothing else It seems reasonable to suppose that the situation is similar in the case of in which case it won't produce fluent Chinese- competence. They can say things like, only possesses speaking behavior. It doesn't model a system that possesses all essentials of human intentionality. is hookup, and thus Searle's notion of a Only Mother Nature exhibits has original speaking Chinese: a man running through the steps of a program without speaking behavior, because fluency "The sky is blue," "You shouldn't wear intentionality For example, it doesn't model the ability to abstract universals from particulars, to recognize the same disputed meaningful symbol, is problematic. Many Anticipated by Where this phrase appears in a box, it identifies a potential 14 John Searle, 1980a, 1980b, 1990b original intentionality. Humans do intentionality. knowing what he is doing is not speaking Chinese, whereas a computer the room is not purely syntactic, requires the ability to extrapolate an orange tie with a red jacket," and relative to some melody played in different keys, to perceive resemblances without matching common properties, and by traditional puzzles show that merely syntactic Only minds are intrinsically intentional. not exhibit original intentionality doing the same thing is speaking Chinese. as Searle claims it is. beyond specified syntactic rules (like "Nothing can be red and blue all over" attack on a previous argument that is raised by the author observer. so on. A system that had these abilities would be able to think, but the Chinese Room doesn't have use of language and symbols is enough to Mental states alone are intrinsically intentional. (or, to use Searle's terms, intrinsic those contained in the rule book). (p. 129). is intentionality); rather, their these abilities and so it isn't a real counterexample to computerized intentionality. generate linguistic competence, even when so that it can be disputed. is supported by Computational systems are only intentional 31 John Searle, 1991 Note: Also, see "The Test Is too Narrow," Map 2, Box 57. there is no recognizable semantic hookup. disputed intentionality is derived from genes. relative to some observer who treats them as Conscious agents can instantiate As articulated by Where this phrase appears in a box, it identifies a reform- by In turn, genes have secondary 34 David Cole, 1984 In Either Case if they had intentional states. Mental states computer programs. Fodor's strengthened is 103 Richard Sharvy, 1983 have intrinsic intentionality. Computer systems intentionality. The regress ends, Computers embody 62 Steve Harnad, 1989 Musical notation. Musicians ulation of another author's argument. The reformulation You can order artist/researcher notion of instantiation does not rule out the disputed have observer relative or "as-if" intentionality. however: Mother Nature exhibits programs; they don't The room is not as Searle describes it. The Chinese Room makes a modularity assumption. Searle's argument makes an untested reading notation read music, not is different enough from the original author's wording to possibility of a conscious agent performing by 105 R. J. Nelson, 1989 is supported by original intentionality. obey them. Searle modularity assumption. It presupposes that certain functional parts of human cognitive performance Semantics may result from Gödelian is supported by sounds. They comprehend abstract misinterprets what a the symbol manipulations. The causal musical structures (which can be warrant the use of the tag. This phrase is also used when is supported by connections that Fodor asks for are supplied (e.g., the ability to speak Chinese) can be modeled independently of the other functional parts of the self-reference. Searle's Chinese Room program does. Computers system. Evolutionary biology suggests that language cannot be modeled independently of other argument ignores the possibility of machines realized in various media besides the original argument is impossible to locate other than in by the man in the room. The idea that conscious signed copies of all seven maps Just the opposite! Husserl don't obey programs the agents can't instantiate computer programs is Aha! 1 plus (sensorimotor) capacities, because linguistic capacities never exist without these evolutionarily more that can have semantics by virtue of self- sound) without relying on the usual its articulation by a later author (e.g., word of mouth), or shows that intentionality can way the man in the room 1 equals 2! primitive capacities. reference. Gödel's theorem shows how semantic hookup to the world. to denote a general philosophical position that is given a obeys a rule book. preposterous. If that idea was true, Alan On Husserl's account, be duplicated by a formal Turing himself wouldn't have known what a machines can encode their own syntax and special articulation by a particular author. 16 Ronald McIntyre, 1986 computer model. Computers embody 57 L. Jonathan Cohen, 1986 intentional states can't Turing machine was, given that some of his The man in the room will thus reflect on their own programs. This Husserl's theory of intentionality be duplicated by a programs. Similarly, a examples specifically involved conscious ? Gödelian self-reference provides a method from www.macrovu.com for shows that mental states are 17 James Mensch, 1991 falling rock doesn't obey understand some Chinese 63 Hannoch Ben-Yami, 1993 104 W. V. O. Quine, 1953 for semantics that Searle has not come to Unmapped Territory This icon indicates areas of argument that lie on or near the is supported by intrinsically intentional. According to Edmund Husserl, meanings and mental states are intentional not because of any relation they bear to anything purely formal model like a computer program. The formal structure of intentionality can be modeled on a computer. According to Husserl, intentionality is constructed from the law of gravity but embodies it. agents going through the steps of the program. is disputed questions. Speaking fluent Chinese requires an ability to answer basic mathematical is disputed There are questions the Chinese Room can't answer. Because the man in the [What time is it?] ? grips with. If the Chinese Room implemented a semantics of this type it could be said to Linguistic semantics is only a matter of correlations of words. Linguists involved in semantic research are not concerned with meanings. In practice, they study correlations between terms of languages. They find synonyms between languages by observing how words are used; no other criterion is scientifically useful. Appeal Additional arguments boundaries of the central issue areas mapped on these maps. It marks regions of potential interest for future mapmakers questions that are essentially the Chinese Room uses a fixed book have intentionality. to meanings has no part in linguistic research, because meanings can only be identified after the languages are already else, but as a matter of their intrinsic character. nonintentional elements in a strict, rule-governed by $500.00 plus shipping and han- way. The construction of intentionality occurs same in Chinese as they are in by of rules, the Chinese Room can Note: Also, see Map 7. understood. and explorers. They are "a sort of entity whose very nature is to is be representational" (p. 109). There are formal, disputed through a process of "passive synthesis," in 35 Lily-Marlene Russow, 1984 English. Thus, the man in the never answer questions about rule-governed aspects of mental states, but those by which the data of sense experience are ordered Simulation of programs requires duplication of functional room will recognize some changing situations. For example, aspects do not exhaustively characterize mental into intentional perceptions "without any active is supported by interconnections. Genuine simulation of a computational system must mathematical parts of Chinese. it can't answer questions like, "What time is it?" or, "What color One of 7 in this Issue Mapping™ series—Get the rest! dling. states. Mental states cannot be reduced to formal participation of the subject" (p. 115–116). accurately duplicate the functional interconnections within that system. In such cases, the man structures, even if they have formal aspects. As Similarly, computers use rules to synthesize The presence of the man in the Chinese Room introduces a homunculus that understands Chinese and is not is this chip?" Because answering The Issue Mapping™ series is published by MacroVU Press, a © 1998 R. E. Horn. such, mental states cannot be duplicated by formal nonintentional data into intentional contents. fails to duplicate the functional interconnections found in a computational merely manipulating symbols. 1 3 such questions is part of ordinary The remaining 6 maps in this Issue Mapping™ series can be ordered with MasterCard, VISA, check, division of MacroVU, Inc. MacroVU is a registered trademark 2 linguistic competence, the Chinese All rights reserved. computer models. So Husserl shows that mental states can be system. Therefore, the Chinese Room is not a genuine simulation of a or money order. Order from MacroVU, Inc. by phone (206–780–9612), by fax (206–842–0296), of MacroVU, Inc. Issue Map and Issue Mapping are trademarks Version 1.0 Edmund Husserl duplicated by formal computer programs. program. Room can never simulate Chinese. of Robert E. Horn. or through the mail (Box 366, 321 High School Rd. NE, Bainbridge Island, WA 98110).