What is this? 1 Can Computers Think? 41 Michael Scriven, 1960, as articulated by Arthur Danto, 1960 42 Arthur Danto, 1960 If a robot can honestly talk about its feelings, it has feelings. The robot's dilemma. Once an advanced robot is built, the way we talk about robots, machines, and We can determine whether a robot has feelings once we configure it to feelings will either change or will not. This poses a dilemma. 1998 (1) use English the way humans do, (2) distinguish truth from falsehood, Can computers (3) answer questions honestly. We then simply ask, "Are you conscious Either Or of your feelings?" If it says, "yes," then it has feelings. 99 Alan Turing, 1950 English will not change, English will change, Computers are not entirely predictable. The belief that Are you conscious Yes. computers are entirely predictable arises from the false assumption of your feelings? in which case in which case (widespread in philosophy and in mathematics) that humans can know everything that follows deductively from a set of premises. be creative? is we will be forced to English can evolve in 1 of 2 ways. disputed But humans learn new things in part through the working out of say the robot is not deductive consequences. Similarly, humans don't know everything The History and Status of the Debate — Map 1 of 7 by conscious, because Either Or a computer will do given some initial state of the computer; we learn is English speakers do new things in part by watching them perform their calculations. disputed not use "conscious" We simply decide to We construct a special language that applies exclusively to machines, for by as a predicate for call robots "conscious," example, a language that uses the suffix "-m" to represent the fact that This info-mural is one of seven An Issue Map™ Publication is disputed by machines. in which case we have an arbitrary and hence unwarranted mentalistic terms like "knows" and "conscious" apply to physical events ("knows-m," "conscious-m") in machines, in which case 98 Anticipated by Alan Turing, 1950 That's not surprising at all ... 100 Alan Turing, 1950 Machines frequently take us by surprise. Computer users and even experts are often surprised by the things that The machine isn't creative, but the human is creatively surprised. 101 Anticipated by Alan Turing, 1950 Surprise is a result of human “argumentation maps” in a change in the language. words like "conscious-m" would be used for the robot in the same situations Machines can never computers do. creativity. Even if we are in which "conscious" would be used for humans. But a lack of knowledge take us by surprise. surprised by what a machine does, about how human consciousness might correspond to robot consciousness Machines are entirely Wow! What that reaction does not mean that the is precisely the issue at hand. is supported by predictable in their is a surprise! machine has done anything original behavior. Because is or creative. It just means that the 43 Paul Weiss, 1960 disputed they never do anything disputed human made a creative prediction series that explores Turing’s In Either Case by Can computers Machines cannot love or be loved. Machines, new, they can never by about what the computer would do, which are mere collections of parts, cannot love or be No means is provided to tell whether a robot is conscious. At best the question is pushed back. surprise us. and was then surprised when the loved. Only unified wholes that govern their parts, such Start Here is disputed as humans, have the capacity to love what is lovable or be loved by those who love. Machines fail on both counts, so In Either Case computer acted differently. question: “Can computers think by they are subhuman and lack minds. have emotions? Simply asking the machine if it has conscious feeling will not help us determine if it does. is supported by is The analytical engine has no pretensions disputed to originate anything. ... It can follow by analysis; but it has no power of and/or will they ever be able is 55 Aaron Sloman and Monica Croucher, 1981 anticipating any analytical relations or Emotions are the product of motivational 1 Alan Turing, 1950 I believe that at the end of the century ... one disputed by representations. Emotions result from interactions between motives and other cognitive states. Motives is supported by 56 Aaron Sloman, 1987 Hierarchical theory of truths. It can do more 104 Alan Turing, 1950 The analytical engine may have are representations of states of the world to be achieved, Yes, machines can will be able to speak of 30 J. J. C. Smart, 1964 Rocks: nonliving and no feelings. 44 Margaret Boden, 1977 prevented, and so forth. A robot with the proper affects. Emotional states 103 Countess of Lovelace, 1842 than you realize, been able to think for itself. Ada Ada. 102 Alan Turing, 1950 to?” Argumentation mapping is Check! arise from hierarchically Lovelace was justified in denying that Having feelings does not logically Emotions are cognitive schemata. motivational processes will have emotions. structured dispositional states, The analytical engine can The argument from human the analytical engine could be machines thinking Salt: nonliving and no feelings. What is essential to emotions is the schema never do anything original. creativity applies to any (or will be able to) without expecting to be is 28 is disputed by imply being a living organism. Although we haven't yet come across any nonliving entities with feelings, perhaps Check! Staplers ... check! Water ... check! of cognitive evaluation that determines the relationship between the emotion and the that is, tendencies to behave in certain ways given certain circumstances. Higher-level The analytical engine (see sidebar, "The Analytical Engine") could is disputed by creative, because she had no evidence that it was creative. But because the analytical engine was in fact a case of surprise. You could always say that being surprised rest of the cognitive states of the subject. think. A computational contradicted. disputed Machines in the future we will. There is no logical dispositions influence lower- never discover any new facts. It is came from you, the interpreter, a method that provides: contradiction in the idea of a nonliving Well, no nonliving things with In order for machines to have emotions, limited to drawing out consequences universal digital computer, it may rather than from anything by can't have emotions. can't being that has feelings. feelings ... yet. they must model the complex interactions level dispositions, which in of facts that it has been provided PHOTO # 32 have had far greater capabilities than original on the other person's or turn influence external Refer to photocopy for she realized. With added speed and involved in the use of such concepts as with. In contemporary terms, a machine's part. For example, if system can possess all Machines can experience never be in emotional states 29 Paul Ziff, 1959 31 J. J. C. Smart, 1964 is disputed by pride, shame, and so forth. Furthermore, these concepts must be (partially) is 57 Geoff Simons, 1985 Emotion is a type of information processing. behavior. computer can only do what it has been programmed to do. precise cropping instructions. Countess of Lovelace storage capacity the analytical engine may have been able to think for itself. a human surprises you with a joke, then you could argue that - a method for portraying major The concept of feeling responsible for the behavior of the system. the surprise was a result of your important elements of (they can never be angry, joyous, fearful, is supported by only applies to living organisms. Because robots is disputed We can imagine artifacts that have feelings. Several cases show that artifacts could have feelings. (1) If the biblical account of creation in Genesis were Margaret Boden disputed by Once we understand the biochemical and cybernetic aspects of human emotion, we interpretation of the joke rather than anything creative on the are mechanistic artifacts, not 45 Daniel Dennett, 1978 joke teller's part. human thinking or etc.). Emotions are necessary for thought. organisms, they cannot have feelings. by true, then humans would be both living creatures and artifacts created by God. (2) We could imagine Our intuitions about pain are incoherent. At present, it's easy to criticize the possibility of robot pain, but only because our everyday will be able to build computers with emotions. The Analytical Engine philosophical, political, and understanding. Therefore, computers can't think. is disputed by self-replicating mechanisms whose offspring would manifest small random alterations, allowing them to evolve. Such mechanisms might be considered living and at the same time artifacts. They are understanding of pain is incoherent and self-contradictory. For example, morphine is sometimes described as preventing the generation of pain, and sometimes as just blocking pain that already exists. But those are inconsistent descriptions. Once we have a coherent theory of pain, a robot could in principle be constructed to instantiate that theory and thereby feel 58 Geoff Simons, 1985 is 97 Computers can never be creative. Computers only do Invented by Charles Babbage circa 1860, the analytical engine was a mechanical computer composed of gears, cranks, and wheels, which could be programmed by punch cards. In principle, Babbage's pragmatic debates artifacts of pain. The Turing test provides I really do disputed what they are programmed to do; they have no originality analytical engine could carry out any of the Alan Turing evidence for emotions as well Corbis-Bettman God as well Once we clear up is feel bad. by or creative powers. calculations a modern electronic computer as living No! Morphine just as for intelligence. Because Note: Similar debates play out in the "Free Will" arguments. can, but due to construction and design Morphine prevents these confusions, disputed behavior is an important part of creatures. is the generation of blocks the pain that we can implement by costs the analytical engine was never built disputed already exists. determining whether a system has Yes, that's a during Babbage's lifetime (several have pain. a theory of pain on emotions, the Turing test is useful person! - a summary of an ongoing, 32 Hilary Putnam, 1964 by a computer. been constructed since). as a test for emotional capacities as "Alive" is not definitionally based on structure. well as for general intelligence. If a Charles Babbage Because the definition of "alive" is not based on structure, it robot can pass the Turing test and if allows for nonhuman robot physiologies. Robots made up of it has a cognitively plausible cogs and transistors instead of neurons and blood vessels might internal structure, then it can have 106 Douglas Hofstadter, 1995 major philosophical debate of have feelings because they might actually be alive. emotions. The ELIZA effect. The ELIZA effect is a Note: Also, see Map 2. 105 Computers have tendency to read more into computer performance That's just an already been than is warranted by their underlying code. For 33 Georges Rey, 1980 is is example, the computerized psychotherapy Machines lack the physiological components of emotion. evolutionary disputed creative. Computer disputed is supported by remnant. It's Implemented Model by models that exhibit program ELIZA (see "ELIZA," Map 2, Box 34) Machines lack the human physiology that is essential to emotions, by the 20th century is 34 Aaron Sloman, 1987 not essential creativity or at least gives apparently sympathetic responses to human for example, the ability to secrete hormones and neuroregulators. 47 concerns, but in fact is only utilizing a set of Because machines can't reproduce such a physiology through disputed Physiology is not essential to emotion. some component of by to emotion. Human emotion can BORIS. BORIS is a narrative reader designed to understand creativity have already canned responses. abstract computational processes, they can't possess emotions. is descriptions of the emotional states of narrative characters. Note: The ELIZA effect was recognized and Can computers have free will? be implemented on a computer been developed. because the relevant features can disputed 46 Michael Dyer, 1987 BORIS can predict the emotional responses of characters and described by ELIZA's creator, Joseph 35 Joseph F. Rychlak, 1991 is supported by by Emotions can be modeled by interpret those responses by tracing them back to their probable Weizenbaum, though he didn't give it that title. - a new way of doing intellec- Machines can't think dialectically, and be modeled (the emotion's Douglas Hofstadter interaction with cognitive states, describing their relations to other causes. dialectical thinking is necessary for cognitive states. Modeling emotions emotions. Emotions are experienced in motivations, etc.). The physiological aspects of emotion involves two tasks: (1) the semantic task of Implemented Model complicated dialectical circumstances, which programming a system to understand Implemented Model is supported by require the ability to make judgments about (which include biochemistry, 3 4 Ninian Smart, 1964 behavior, and proprioception) are emotions, and (2) the functional/behavioral 48 108 Philip Johnson-Laird, 1988a tual history. Humans also lack free Humans are programmed. If you accept determinism, then you others and gauge oppositions. Machines can't task of programming a system to behave reason in that way, so machines can't experience evolutionary remnants; they are OpEd. OpEd is an editorial reader that deals with The jazz generator. The jazz will. Whether or not is supported by accept that nature has programmed you to behave in certain ways in not essential. emotionally through the interaction of is supported by nonnarrative editorials—for example, critical book is supported by computers have free will is emotions. emotional states and other cognitive states, generator produces chord certain contexts, even though that programming is subtler than the reviews. The program tracks the beliefs of the writer sequences and uses them to is irrelevant to the issue of programming a computer receives. Supported by such as planning, learning, and recall. disputed "Symbol Systems Cannot Think Dialectically," as well as the beliefs the writer ascribes to his or her improvise chords, bass-line whether machines can critics. Unlike BORIS, OpEd is able to deal with by think. People can think, Map 3, Box 25. melodies, and rhythms. Joseph Rychlak nonnarrative texts, in which "the writer explicitly What does it and they don't have free 50 Aaron Sloman, 1987 supports one set of beliefs while attacking another." Emotions are the solution to a design Implemented Model will. People are just 5 [H]uman beings are slaves of brute matter, as deterministic as Free will is an illusion According to the modern scientific view, compelled to act in particular ways by virtue is supported by 36 37 Geoffrey Jefferson, 1949 is problem. Emotions (both in organic creatures and Emotions are necessary for thought. in artificial creations) are the solution to a design 107 H. Gelernter, 1963 machines are. So machines of experience. We may there is simply no room at all for "freedom of biochemical and neuronal factors. What Emotional experience is necessary for thought. The only entities disputed The geometry program. The geometry may yet be able to think. think we are free, but that of the human will" (1986, p. 306). we see is the illusory nature of free will Only systems that can be in emotional is supported by that can possess human abilities are entities that can act on the basis of felt by problem—how to cope intelligently with a rapidly states can be said to think. changing environment, given established goals and program is a system that works backward is just an illusion of (1985, p. 109). emotions. No mechanism can feel anything. Therefore, machines can't from geometric theorems, searching for Implemented Model experience. Actually, we possess human abilities, in particular, the ability to think. limited processing resources. In both humans and machines the problem is solved with intelligent is supported by their proofs by means–end analysis. This 110 Jim Meehan, 1975 are determined to do what Note: Also, see "Mechanisms Can't Possess Human Consciousness," Map 6, Box 10. planning breaks down the problems using a ... George Ant was very is supported by we do by our underlying computational strategies. TALE-SPIN. This program writes thirsty. George wanted to Implemented Model hierarchy of goals and subgoals. To avoid neural machinery. is supported by stories with characters that have get some water. George 49 impossible searches the program uses is supported by goals and subgoals dependent on walked from his patch of 38 David Gelernter, 1994 51 Nico Frijda and Jaap Swagerman, 1987 DAYDREAMER. DAYDREAMER is heuristics to select the most promising their motivations. Its characters Computers must be capable of emotional association to think. In order to Emotions are manifestations of concern search paths. ground across the meadow a stream of thought generator that cooperate in each other's plans and through the valley to a river Geoff Simons is supported by think, a computer must be capable of a full spectrum of thought. Computers may be realization. Emotional states result from a "concern specifies how representations of can form competitive relationships contain? Marvin Minsky capable of high-end thinking, which is focused, analytic, and goal-oriented. But in order is bank ... realization system" that matches internal representations emotional states affect other forms of Implemented Model when necessary to achieve their to think as humans do they must also be capable of low-end thinking, which is diffuse, disputed against actual circumstances in order to cope with an cognitive processing. It does this by goals. The program can also analogical, and associative. For example, a flower and a flowered dress might be associated by uncertain environment. Computers that implement the concocting "daydreams" of possible 109 Margaret Masterman, 1971 represent a wide range of 6 Philip Johnson-Laird, 1988a in low-end thought by a diffuse set of emotionally charged linkages. concern realization system go through emotional states. outcomes and reactions and then using Haiku program. A program has communications between its Free will results from a multilevel representational structure. those daydreams to represent the stream been written that develops haiku All white in the buds Options for action I flash snow peaks characters. A multilevel representational structure is capable of producing free of consciousness of the system. (a style of Japanese poetry) will. The system must have levels for: through interaction with humans. in the spring 52 Andrew Ortony, G. Clure, and A. Collins, 1988 • representing options for action (e.g., go to dinner, read, take a walk); 39 Tom Stonier, 1992 Emotions are cognitive evaluations. The model provides poets with Bang the sun has • representing the grounds for deciding which option to take (e.g., Decision-making process Emotional machines need limbic systems. Emotions are determined by the structure, content, is supported by synonym lists to aid in word fogged. Implemented Model is choose the one that makes me happy, choose by flipping a coin); Emotional machines need the machine equivalent of the 53 Michael Arbib, 1992 choice and also constrains line The computer recognizes that is and organization of knowledge representations and disputed • representing a method for deciding which decision-making process human limbic system. The limbic system subserves + Emotions color perception and action. length to ensure that the haiku is 112 Margaret Boden, 1990 letter A without having been by to follow (e.g., follow the most "rational" method, follow the fastest emotional states, fosters drives, and motivates behavior. disputed the processes that operate on them. A machine ! Cognitive appraisal, in the form of knowledge properly formed. The haiku Connectionist systems programmed to do so. method). Computers that have been programmed with such multilevel structures Grounds for choosing a decision-making process is supported by It is also responsible for the pleasure-pain principle, which guides the activities of all higher animals. Through the development of artificial limbic systems, by equipped with the correct knowledge-handling mechanisms, which result in appropriate behavior, will have emotions. is disputed by # @ * !! # @ representation plus appropriate behavior, is not enough to convert bare information processing into emotion. Such a theory does program can run without human interaction by making arbitrary is supported by exhibit creativity. Connectionist networks can Philip Johnson-Laird can exhibit free will. choices from its synonym lists. learn to recognize patterns emotional machines will be attainable in 20–50 years. is supported by not account for the fact that emotions can without being specifically color one's perceptions and actions. For Implemented Model programmed to do so. 40 Hans Moravec, 1988 54 Philip Johnson-Laird, 1988a example, the perception of a winning Note: Also, see Map 4. 7 Geoff Simons, 1985 Artificial minds should mimic animal is Feelings are information signals in a cognitive system. Feelings are needs and emotions, touchdown in a football game could be 111 Harold Cohen, B. Cohen, 8 Geoff Simons, 1985 which correspond to information signals of two kinds: (1) needs, which arise from lower-level computationally modeled as knowledge Free will is a decision-making process. evolution. The fastest progress in AI research disputed and P. Nii, 1984 Conditional jumps constitute free will. The ability of a system to perform conditional jumps when distributed processors that monitor certain internal aspects of the body; (2) emotions, which also representation plus appropriate Free will is a decision-making process characterized can be made by imitating the capabilities of by AARON. AARON produces is confronted with changing information gives it the potential to make free decisions. For example, a computer animals, starting near the bottom of the arise from lower-level distributed processors but originate as cognitive interpretations of external behavior. But this doesn't account for the by selection of options, discrimination between is supported by may or may not "jump" when it interprets the instruction "proceed to address 9739 if the contents of register is supported by visual art by selecting a disputed clusters of data, and choice between alternatives. phylogenetic scale and working upward toward events, especially social events. A robot could have feelings if its computational structure implemented differently colored perceptions of fans of random starting point on a by A are less than 10." The decision making that results from this ability frees the machine from being a mere those 2 kinds of signals. opposing teams. Altogether the seven maps: Because computers already make such choices, they animals with more complex nervous systems. canvas and then drawing lines puppet of the programmer. possess free will. from that point using a complex set of if-then rules. 10 Jack Copeland, 1993 12 A. J. Ayer, 1954 Implemented Model Free will arises from random selection of alternatives in nil - summarize over 800 major Free will is necessary for moral Should we pretend computers preference situations. When an otherwise deterministic system responsibility. Randomness and makes a random choice in a nil preference situation, that system moral responsibility are incompatible. We cannot be 113 Sheldon Klein, 1975 exhibits free will. A nil preference situation is one in which an agent responsible for what happens randomly any more than we Book generator. This ... Lady Buxley was must choose between a variety of equally preferred alternatives (for can be responsible for what is predetermined. Because any automatic novel writer near James. James example, whether to eat one orange or another from a bag of equally adequate account of moral responsibility should be grounded generates 2,100-word caressed Lady moves in the debates threaded is supported by good oranges). The available alternatives may have arisen from Buxley with passion. is supported by in the notion of free will, randomness cannot adequately mysteries. It develops a is disputed will never be able to think? Is the brain a computer? deterministic factors, but "when the dice roll," the choice is made characterize free will. rudimentary plot based James was by Lady 114 Margaret Boden, 1977 freely. is supported by on the conflicting Buxley's lover ... The book generator is inadequate. The motivations of its is book-writing program's fiction is inadequate for the 13 Jack Copeland, 1993 characters and fits the following reasons. (1) The stories are shapeless and disputed into claims, rebuttals, and Random choice and responsibility model of a mystery story rambling. (2) The specific motivational patterns are are compatible. An agent that chooses by 11 by revealing the relatively crude and unstructured. (3) The is 9 Alan Turing, 1951 randomly in a nil preference situation (one murderer at the end. identification of the murderer comes as a statement Machines can exhibit free Randomization sacrifices in which all choices are equally preferred) 59 Anticipated by Alan Turing, 1950 60 Alan Turing, 1950 disputed responsibility. Machines rather than as a discovery. by will by way of random is is still responsible for its actions. A gunman The heads-in-the-sand objection. The transmigration consolation. selection. Free will can be disputed that make decisions based on can randomly choose to kill 1 of 5 hostages. The consequences of machine thought are too dreadful to The heads-in-the-sand objection is counterrebuttals random choices have no is produced in a machine that by He chooses at random, but he is still accept. We should "stick our heads in the sand" and hope that too trivial to deserve a response; 79 John Searle, 1992 80 Jack Copeland, 1993 responsibility for their actions, is disputed is generates random values, for responsible for killing the person whom he machines will never be able to think or have souls. consolation is more appropriate. It Nothing is intrinsically Programs are not because it is then a matter of disputed by disputed example, by sampling random picks, because he was responsible for taking may be comforting to believe that a digital computer. The universally realizable. chance that they act one way by by noise. the people hostage in the first place. souls are passed from humans to syntactic structures that Even if it is true that during rather than another. Because Random choice only revokes responsibility machines when humans die by the define computers are not some interval of time a pattern - 97-130 arguments and rebuttals responsibility is necessary for if the choice is between alternatives of theological doctrine of the intrinsic to physics; they are Can computers free will, such machines lack of molecule movements on the 81 John Searle, 1992 differing ethical value. transmigration of souls. ascribed to physical systems wall is isomorphic with, for Universal free will. by humans. So the That wall doesn't 117 Harry Collins, 1994 16 Jack Copeland, 1993 That wall can example, the formal pattern of realizability is not 116 Harry Collins, 1994 Being a deterministic machine is question, "Is the brain a support the same the WordStar computer essential to the Scientific reasoning The socialization test. The importance of digital computer?" is be interpreted counterfactuals socialization is demonstrated by the "socialization compatible with having free will. as a digital program, the wall will not argument. requires social per map Humans and computers are both ill-defined, because syntax as WordStar. support the same counterfactuals agreement. Computers test," a variant of the Turing test. In the Does God prohibit is can be ascribed to any computer. Even without socialization test, a human control and a machine reason deterministic systems, but this is is as the program. If the WordStar is cannot reason is disputed 14 sufficiently complex universal realizability, are both given a passage of "mucked-up" English. compatible with their being free. disputed program had been given different disputed scientifically because disputed by The helplessness system. Syntactic it is still true that Both the machine and the human control must Actions caused by an agent's beliefs, by input, it would have behaved by they are not members of by argument. When agents structures are not just syntax is observer is supported by correct all the errors and transliterate the passage desires, inclinations, and so forth are (human or machine) make differently. But the wall, which relative. And this is society. Scientific laws free, because if those factors had been multiply realizable in was not engineered to implement into normal English. If a judge cannot tell which - 70 issue areas in the 7 maps choices at random, they lack enough to show that and data do not follow different, the agent might have acted numerous physical systems, WordStar, would not respond to from the application of an text was error-corrected by machine and which computers from thinking? free will, because their they are universally nothing, including the by the human control subject, then the machine scientifically? differently. choices are then beyond different "input" (that is, a brain, is intrinsically a algorithm, but are realizable in any physical different pattern of molecular developed through a passes this test for socialization. their control. As J. A. system. digital computer. Note: For more on the Turing test, see Map 2. Shaffer (1968) puts it, the organization) in the same way. quasipolitical process of agent is "at the helpless is So WordStar is not universally negotiation. Harry Collins - 32 sidebars history and further is disputed by 2 Computers can't have free will. Machines only do what they have been mercy of these eruptions within him which control his behavior." is disputed by 15 Jack Copeland, 1993 The Turing randomizer is only a tiebreaker. The helplessness argument is misleading, because it implies that random processes control all decision making—for 61 Anticipated by Alan Turing, 1950 62 Alan Turing, 1950 disputed by is supported by realizable. coun •ter • fac • tu •al: A conditional (if-then) statement whose "if" clause runs counter to the facts is supported by 118 Carl Hempel, 1985 Computers can't introduce new I throwed trash the wastebasket. I threw the trash in the wastebasket. background designed or programmed to example, the decision of whether to wait at the curb or The theological objection. The theological objection is terms or explanatory principles. It's vocabulary is do. They lack free will, but free will: The ability to make is You have no ungrounded. The view that only 82 of reality. For example, the statement, "if pigs had jump out in front of an oncoming truck. All the Turing Only entities with immortal soul! wings then they would fly," is a counterfactual, A computer cannot be original because fixed! It can't come free will is necessary for voluntary, unconstrained decisions. disputed souls can think. God has given is humans have souls is as ungrounded and Formal programs can be realized in up with any new randomizer does is determine what a machine will do in disputed multiple physical media. The same formal because the "if" clause—that pigs have wings—is it cannot introduce new theoretical thought. Therefore, Freely made decisions are independent those situations in which options are equally preferred. by souls to humans, but not arbitrary as the view that men have souls terms or principles. Computers' terms or principles ... 119 Richard Scheines, 1988 computers can't think. of the influence of such deterministic by but women don't. For all we know, in program could be realized in a digital computer, false. to machines. Therefore, "discoveries" are limited to those that Computers can introduce factors as genetics (nature) and humans can think, and creating thinking machines we may be in a human brain, in beer cans and toilet paper, new terms. Computers can or in any number of physical implementations. can be expressed using the program's conditioning (nurture). computers can't. serving God's ends by providing fixed vocabulary and conceptual introduce new terms using dwellings for souls he creates. The program is defined solely in terms of its is automated principles of 18 Geoff Simons, 1985. formal syntactic structure; its mode of physical apparatus. Human discovery, by disputed 78 is supported by contrast, involves the introduction of explanatory adequacy. This Some computers can program themselves. Automatic implementation is irrelevant. by has been shown using a programming systems (APs) write computer programs by following The biological assumption. The brain is a machine that can Note: For more multiple realizability arguments, new terms and principles that cannot be think. Its neurobiological processes are similar to or identical with defined in terms of those previously program that uses explanatory The argumentation maps: some of the same heuristics that human programmers use. They see the "Can functional states generate Beer adequacy principles to is supported by specify the task that the program is to perform, choose a language to the information processes of a computer. consciousness?" arguments on Map 6 and sidebar, available. 17 is Note: More specific versions of the biological assumption introduce new terms in the write the program in, articulate the problem area the program will be Can computers Computers only exhibit the free disputed "Formal Systems: An Overview," on Map 7. domain of "causal models"—a applied to, and make use of information about various programming argument are represented on Map 3 and on Map 5. will of their programmers. by class of mathematical theories strategies. Programs written by such APs are not written by humans, 120 Carl Hempel, 1985 popular in social science. Computers can't have free will and so computers that run those programs do not just mirror the free Computers can't adequately evaluate - arrange debate so that the cur- because they cannot act except as they will of humans. 115 hypotheses. A computer model of are determined to by their designers and programmers. That's an 85 Keith Stanovich, 1990 Computers can't reason ? scientific discovery would have to use a criterion of preference to choose between understand arithmetic? explanation by And then a miracle happens ... scientifically. hypotheses that account for available data is is supported by is is miracle! Penrose does not explain how Computers are unable to equally well. But criteria of preference tend disputed de • ter • min • ism: The belief that rent stopping point of each 22 Hilary Putnam, similar to 84 Roger Penrose, 1990 disputed quantum effects in the brain might by think and reason as human to be imprecise and idiosyncratic, so it is 20 Ninian Smart, 1964 all actions and events are determined 1964 Low-level quantum by affect consciousness. He simply scientists do. unlikely that such a criterion could be is supported by is supported by Preprogrammed humans have psychological by the influences of nature and history. The robot learning effects are I'm not assumes that quantum effects and implemented on a computer. states. If determinism is true, then humans are programmed Human actions result from strict causal response. A robot uncomputable. The computable. the brain are miraculously related. by nature and yet have psychological states. Thus, if laws that describe the brain and its could be programmed 1+1? What biological phenomena that is determinism is true, we have a counterexample to the claim relation to the world. Free will is an to produce new 63 Stanley L. Jaki, 1969; Fred Dretske, 1990 does that 64 William Rapaport, underlie consciousness 123 Harry Collins, 1994 debate thread is easily seen disputed by that preprogrammed entities can't have psychological states. Supported by "Humans Are Programmed," Box 4. illusion. behaviors by learning in the same way humans do. For example, a program that learned to tell is disputed by Computers can't add, much less think. Machines only operate on uninterpreted symbols. Even when they perform the operations corresponding to addition, they are merely shuffling symbols that are meaningless to them. 1+1=2 mean? is disputed 1988 Computers can learn to add. Computers that possess internal semantic networks can learn is supported by 83 The operation of the brain is computable. Once we have a sufficient understanding of the laws is disputed operate at a level at which quantum effects could exert an influence. Because quantum effects are not computable, the brain and is disputed by 86 Herbert Simon, 1995 Quantum effects are irrelevant to symbolic processes. is 121 Computers have already reasoned scientifically. Implemented Model 122 Pat Langley, Hubert Simon, Gary Bradshaw, and Jan Zytkow, 1987 BACON. A program for discovering laws from BACON only works when humans filter its data. Bacon only works through its interaction with scientists who filter its data and thereby predetermine its - identify original arguments by 19 Paul Ziff, 1959 These manipulations become mathematics only by of physics and the structure of the consciousness may be Quantum uncertainties are unimportant to the study of symbolic disputed data by applying heuristics, BACON has discovered Preprogrammed robots can't new jokes would not dialectically in the same by by Computer systems exist that is results. If humans did not simply be repeating when humans interpret them. way that humans do. brain, we will be able to precisely noncomputational and thought processes, because they occur at a low level of Kepler's law of planetary motion, Galileo's law of disputed constrain its data, it is doubtful that have psychological states. 21 Paul Ziff, 1959 Note: An earlier version of this claim was made have reasoned as scientists is supported by uniform acceleration, and Ohm's law of electrical The record player argument. A robot "plays" its is jokes the programmer Thus, while they do not simulate the operation of the brain nonalgorithmic. organization and are averaged out before they can affect by BACON would produce any Because they are programmed, by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930s and with a computer. higher-level processes. do, proposing explanatory resistance. robots have no psychological states behavior in the same way that a phonograph plays a disputed had entered into its intrinsically know how to hypotheses and choosing original science. memory, but would published in Remarks on the Foundations of add, they can learn. Note: The history of BACON program is compex Supported by of their own. They may act as if is supported by record. It is just programmed to behave in certain by Mathematics (1956). among them. and extends back into the 1960s. over 380 protagonists world- they have psychological states, but ways. For example, "When we laugh at the joke of a be inventing jokes in "The Front-End Assumption Is only because their programmers robot, we are really appreciating the wit of a human the same way humans Dubious," Box 75. have psychological states and have programmer, and not the wit of the robot" (Putnam, do. Implemented Model programmed the robots to act 1964, p. 679). 65 Fred Dretske, 1990 accordingly. The marijuana-sniffing dog. 124 B. G. Buchanan, D. H. Smith, W. C. White, wide over 40 years is supported by Computers can't have an adding thought is supported by R. Gritter, E. A. Feigenbaum, J. Ledergerg, (much less have a more complex thought) sniff and C. Djerassi, 1976 23 Paul Ziff, 1959 24 Hilary Putnam, 1964 because the symbols being added don't DENDRAL. DENDRAL is an expert system that The reprogramming argument. Humans can't Reprogramming is consistent with free will. The reprogramming argument fails to have any meaning to the computer, and analyzes and identifies chemical compounds by is supported by be reprogrammed in the arbitrary way that robots show that robots lack free will for the following reasons. they don't have any meaning because they forming and testing hypotheses from experimental • Humans can be reprogrammed without affecting their free will. For example, a criminal don't play a causal role based on that meaning. Are computers can be. For instance, a robot can be programmed to data. Meta-DENDRAL, a component of DENDRAL, - make the current frontier of act tired no matter what its physical state is, A trained dog, for example, will has discovered how to synthesize previously unknown is might be reprogrammed into a good citizen via a brain operation, but he could still make free wag its tail when it smells marijuana, but whereas a human normally becomes tired only after disputed decisions (perhaps, for example, deciding to become a criminal once again). chemical compounds as well as entirely new rules (like a robot) it's only responding because some kind of exertion. The actions of the robot by • Robots cannot always be arbitrarily reprogrammed in the way that the reprogramming it's been trained to do so, not because the of chemical analysis. It even has a publication to its depend entirely on the whims of the programmer, argument suggests. For instance, if a robot is psychologically isomorphic to a human, it meaning of the smell causes it to wag its tail. credit. whereas human behavior is self-determined. cannot be arbitrarily reprogrammed. • Even if robots can be arbitrarily reprogrammed, this does not exclude them from having debate easily identifiable 25 L. Jonathan Cohen, 1955 Computers do not choose Put it over there. free will. Such a robot may still produce spontaneous and unpredictable behavior. inherently disabled? 88 Alan Turing, 1950 Disability arguments derive from our limited experience with Can computers draw machines. Because the machines we've - provide summaries of eleven is supported by He has no mind of his That robot's been Can computers be persons? their own rules. We refer to seen are clunky, ugly, mechanical, and people as "having no mind of their own right now. He's reprogrammed but acting like a computer. it still acts spontaneously so forth, we assume that a machine could own" when they only follow the never fall in love or enjoy strawberries rules or commands of others. and unpredictably ... 87 Anticipated by Alan Turing, is and cream. But these are just bad Computers are in a similar disputed inductions from a limited base of 1950 major philosophical camps of situation. They are programmed analogies? The argument from by experience. with rules and follow commands without conscious choice. disabilities. Machines can never Therefore, computers lack free do X, where X is any of a variety will. of abilities that are regarded as 89 Anticipated by Alan Turing, 1950 is distinctly human, for example, You can't Computers can't enjoy strawberries 90 Alan Turing, 1950 126 John Pollock, 1989 Personhood: Historical Background the protagonists (or schools of disputed being friendly, having a sense of do X. is by humor, making mistakes, enjoying and cream. Computers will never possess Computers may be made to enjoy is An artificial person can be built. An Many contemporary and historical debates have dealt with the concept of personhood. 26 Joseph Rychlak, 1991 is supported by the human ability to enjoy strawberries and is strawberries and cream. Computers disputed disputed artificial person can be built from physical The abortion debate deals with the status of the fetus as a person. Animal rights is supported by Computers can't do otherwise. An agent’s actions are free if the agent can do otherwise strawberries and cream, or by thinking about oneself. cream. disputed might be made that will enjoy strawberries by ingredients provided it adequately models human theorists ask whether various species of animals are persons or not. The emancipation than perform them. This means that an agent is free only if it can change its goals. But only dialectical reasoning allows an agent to change its goals and thereby act freely. Because machines ? 69 David Chalmers, Robert French, Note: A great deal of the debate by and cream, but the only importance of this would be to illuminate other issues, such as 125 Computers can't be persons. Machines can rationality, which is the suitable structure necessary for personhood. of the slaves was won when the Supreme Court was convinced that African Americans were people and not property. represented on these maps are thought). are not capable of that kind of thinking, they are not free. 66 and Douglas Hofstadter, 1995 the possibility of friendship between man never be persons. They lack ethical status and Note: Also, see the "Can physical symbol systems think dialectically?" arguments on Map 3. Computers can't understand analogies. Computers SME only draws analogies from prestructured forms of disability arguments— cannot bear responsibility for their actions. At best arguments that machines can't be and machine. The question of whether robots are persons has been asked since at least the release cannot understand analogical comparisons or metaphors. For representations. SME creates analogies using high- they can display personlike behavior. How do I get a is level representations that are structured with those specific creative, can't use analogies, can't Note: Many other arguments about computers of Karel Capek's play R.U.R. (Rossum's Universal Robots) in the 1920s. This play— example, a machine could not understand the sentence, "She from which the name "robot" derives—is about the struggle of intelligent robots to disputed ran the like the wind." analogies in mind. Its behavior provides no evidence of be conscious, and so forth—and being persons permeate the maps but have been 127 Selmer Bringsjord, 1992 by is intelligence because the analogies it discovers are already so could also be thought of as placed in other regions to emphasize what specific gain their civil liberties. Note: Analogy arguments are also discussed by George disputed Robots can do intelligent things but will never be 27 Selmer Bringsjord, 1992 Lakoff in the "Symbolic Data" arguments on Map 3. built into the data it works with. supports for this claim. aspect of machinehood or personhood is in question. by persons. AI will eventually succeed in building robots that In the debate over artificial intelligence, personhood again becomes an issue, because Free will yields an infinitude that finite machines can't reproduce. Unlike deterministic Supported by 92 Alan Turing, 1950 can behave intelligently but will never make robots that are is supported by machines (e.g., Turing machines), persons can be in an infinite number of states in a finite period "The Front-End Assumption Is Dubious," Box 74. if computers are able to think, then their ethical status may have to be upgraded. Computers can make certain kinds of mistakes. Those actually persons. Persons are genuine things (rather than Moreover, many artificial intelligence researchers hold the dream of creating artificial of time. That infinite capacity allows persons to make decisions that machines could never make. who think computers can't make mistakes confuse errors of logical constructions) that bear psychological properties and Note: Bringsjord's argument is fleshed out in the "Can automata think?" arguments on Map 7. life in the form of an artificial person, in part because the concept of intelligence is functioning (errors that result from the physical construction of the that can bring about states of affairs in the world. closely related to the concept of personhood. Some think that a thinking computer Also, see the "Can computers be persons?" arguments on this map. 70 David Chalmers, Robert French, machine) with errors of conclusion (errors that result from the and Douglas Hofstadter, 1995 91 Anticipated by Alan Turing, Note: Bringsjord supports his claim with a wide range of would be straight-off a person, because we know that thinking is (to some degree) 1950 machine's reasoning process). It is true that machines can't commit is supported by arguments that are dispersed throughout the maps. See the "Can Objects, attributes, and relations are too part of being a person. Some think that a robot cannot think unless it is a genuine is Computers can't make errors of functioning if they are properly constructed. But machines computers have free will?" arguments on this map, and the "Can person, because otherwise there would be no "one" doing any thinking. rigidly distinguished by SME. In order for can commit errors of conclusion, for example, by making faulty disputed its analogical mappings to work, SME assumes a mistakes. Computers differ I can't go automata think?" arguments on Map 7. printed copy? by Implemented Model from humans in that humans wrong. inferences based on a lack of adequate information. rigid distinction between objects, attributes, and relations. But it is unclear whether humans can make mistakes, whereas 68 Brian Falkenhaimer, K. Forbus, and D. Gentner, 1990 computers can't. They are SME. SME is a structure-mapping engine that discovers analogies is make such a rigid distinction. For example, we is supported by sometimes conceptualize wealth as an object that easily unmasked in the Turing is All ravens Legend between domains by a set of match rules. The analogies that result are judged according to the criteria of clarity, richness, abstractness, and systematicity. SME has found mappings between heat and water disputed by flows between people, but at other times we conceptualize wealth as an attribute that changes test, because humans would frequently make mistakes in disputed by are black. 128 Dwight Van De Vate Jr., 1971 A machine isn't a person That ain't a person like That's just some crummy 129 Anticipated by Dwight Van De Vate Jr., 1971 130 Dwight Van De Vate Jr., 67 is supported by with each transaction we make. complex arithmetic whereas unless society deems it one. A us! machine ... 1971 Computers have flow, solar systems and atoms, and in other domains. computers never do. machine or an individual is not a Machines can behave like Focus Box: The lowest-numbered box in each issue area is an introductory focus box. 75 David Chalmers, Robert French, persons in the imitation Laboratory performance isn't The arguments on these maps are organized by links that carry a range of meanings: understood analogy. and Douglas Hofstadter, 1995 Note: For more on the Turing test, is supported by person until society collectively enough for full reciprocity of The focus box introduces and summarizes the core dispute of each issue area, sometimes Existing models have see Map 2. declares it one. This requires game. A machine could treat others Implemented Model 71 David Chalmers, Robert French, and All-encompassing representations like a person and be treated like a person social behavior. A machine in as an assumption and sometimes as a general claim with no particular author. discovered and Douglas Hofstadter, 1995 could not be processed. The all- having a gender, a flesh-and-blood a lab playing the imitation game is understood analogies. body, the ability to feel pain, and so in an imitation game. Arguments that uphold or defend another claim. Examples include: 72 Keith Holyoak and is SME's treatment of relations is too purpose representation that a front-end Note: Also, see the "Can the imitation not yet a person because it is not disputed rigid. In SME, relations are treated as n-place module would provide to a computer forth. If a machine lacks any of really being treated like one. It's supporting evidence, further argumentation, thought experiments, Arguments With No Authors: Arguments that are not attributable to a particular source is supported by Paul Thagard, 1989 these—if, for example, it is is game determine whether computers can is supported by by predicates that can only be mapped to other model would have to encode a vast think?" arguments on Map 2. treated like an artifact in an extensions or qualifications, and implemented models. ACME. ACME is a disputed is (e.g., general philosophical positions, broad concepts, common tests in artificial intelligence) connectionist network that n-place predicates. For example, attraction is a amount of information, enough for it to disembodied and can't feel pain—it by experiment, which we can unplug won't be recognized as or treated as disputed are listed with no accompanying author. discovers cross domain 2-place predicate that could be represented as adapt to all the various contexts and 93 Anticipated by and ignore as we see fit. a person. by is supported by analogical mappings. The "attracts (sun, planet)" and then mapped to analogies it might be used in. Such a is supported by Alan Turing, 1950 You see? I'm a human ACME network uses structural, "attracts (nucleus, electron)." But it is unlikely representation would be too bulky for Computers can't just like you! I won the Let's go to A charge made against another claim. Examples include: Citations: Complete bibliographic citations can be found in the booklet that accompanies semantic, and pragmatic that the human mind is so rigid in its treatment efficient processing. think about game, I fooled you every is disputed logical negations, counterexamples, attacks on an argument's emphasis, potential dangers an argument might raise, thought this map. constraints to seek out those mappings. of relational mappings. themselves. 94 Alan Turing, 1950 is supported by time, I can do anything a lunch. ... by Computers cannot be human ... You can order artist/researcher experiments, and implemented models. Methodology: A further discussion of argumentation analysis methodology can be found the object of their is Computers can be the subject of their own is supported by 76 David Chalmers, Robert French, own thoughts. disputed thoughts. When a computer solves equations, the in the booklet that accompanies this map. is and Douglas Hofstadter, 1995 by equations can be said to be the object of its thought. Implemented Model disputed Perception depends on analogy. Similarly, when a computer is used to predict its own by How we see things depends in part on behavior or to modify its own program, we can say that it is is interpreted as Anticipated by Where this phrase appears in a box, it identifies a potential signed copies of all seven maps 77 Douglas Hofstadter and what high-level analogical processes we the object of its own thoughts. A distinctive reconfiguration of an earlier claim. attack on a previous argument that is raised by the author Melanie Mitchell, 1995 use. For example, Saddam Hussein will COPYCAT. COPYCAT is a model be perceived quite differently depending you so I so that it can be disputed. that discovers analogies using 3 on whether he is viewed as analogous to treat treat components: (1) a "slipnet" of abstract That's not the same Sensory data Adolf Hitler (a ruthless aggressor) or to 95 Anticipated by 96 Alan Turing, 1950 from www.macrovu.com for As articulated by Where this phrase appears in a box, it identifies a reform- 73 David Chalmers, 74 David Chalmers, 131 Dwight Van De Vate Jr., Platonic concepts whose relations can as understanding that Robin Hood (a generous crusader). Alan Turing, Diversity of behavior depends only on storage I 1971 change as the model runs, (2) a Robert French, Robert French, and is supported by you Unmapped Territory This icon indicates areas of argument that lie on or near the ulation of another author's argument. The reformulation and Douglas Hofstadter, Socrates is like a 1950 capacity. Great diversity of behavior is possible for Reciprocity of social "workspace" of perceptual activity midwife. Douglas Hofstadter, Computers can't machines if they have large enough storage capacities. Additional boundaries of the central issue areas mapped on these maps. is different enough from the original author's wording to that acts like a short-term memory, 1995 1995 Front end exhibit much The objection is based on the misconception that it is behavior is required for warrant the use of the tag. This phrase is also used when ACME doesn't understand (a (b )), The front-end like personhood. Persons must: It marks regions of potential interest for future mapmakers • be capable of treating $500.00 plus shipping and han- arguments and (3) a "coderack" of agents that diversity of not possible for a machine to have much storage are probabilistically selected to carry analogy. ACME's claim to (c (d )) ... is assumption is dubious. is like and explorers. the original argument is impossible to locate other than in understand analogies is similar to Models that use behavior. Humans disputed capacity. others like persons in a out tasks in the workspace. can display much its articulation by a later author (e.g., word of mouth), or overblown. All ACME does is (A (B )), preconfigured by variety of contexts; to denote a general philosophical position that is given a COPYCAT is neither a symbol take algebraic sentences in (C (D )) representations and hand- more diversity of me • be treated like a person by manipulator nor a connectionist is supported by ....Lady Buxleythat was is supported by behavior than members of society in a dling. predicate logic notation and tailored data assume a you special articulation by a particular author. network, though it draws on both compare them. For example, near James.module James Computer machines ever will. variety of contexts. paradigms. Representations are not separate front-end it only understands that caressed could be Lady built that would model is One of 7 in this Issue Mapping™ series—Get the rest! delivered hand-tailored to the model, Buxley data with into passion. dispu treat but are built up through fluid "Socrates is like a midwife" to filter sensory the treat The Issue Mapping™ series is published by MacroVU Press, a division of MacroVU, Inc. the extent that it understands ted © 1998 R. E. Horn. All rights reserved. MacroVU is a registered trademark of MacroVU, Inc. Issue Map and Issue Mapping are trademarks interactions between low-level and model's representational you me The remaining 6 maps in this Issue Mapping™ series can be ordered with MasterCard, high-level components. that "(a(b)), (c(d)) ... is similar form. James was Lady by so VISA, check, or money order. Order by phone (206–780–9612), by fax (206–842–0296), Version 1.0 of Robert E. Horn. to (A(B)), (C(D))." or through the mail (Box 366, 321 High School Rd. NE, Bainbridge Island, WA 98110).